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Preface
This doctoral dissertation deals with two distinct areas of research in
applied microeconomic theory. Chapters 1 and 4 are from the eld of
industrial organization and are concerned with the provision of product
characteristics in two specic situations, namely the case of vertically
related markets and the case of insurance markets. Chapters 2 and 3 try
to shed light on a central issue in political economics, the provision of
incentives for public o¢ cials like politicians and bureaucrats. The single
chapters are arranged in the order of their inception and can be read
independently.
Chapter 1 deals with the impact of vertical integration on product
quality. The theoretical literature in this eld (in particular Tirole, 1988,
and Economides, 1999) has emphasized that vertically related rms tend
to underprovide quality relative to an integrated rm because if one rm
improves the value of its component, this allows the other rm to charge
more for its own component. Hence, quality provision in vertical chains
exerts positive externalities between the rms that are not internalized,
which leads to underprovision.2
Chapter 1 tackles the view that integration necessarily improves in-
centives to provide product quality. It sets up a model of successive
monopolies which, among other things, improves on previous approaches
2This argument is well in line with the legal strategies that a number of rms have
pursued in antitrust cases and regulatory hearings, where the maintenance of quality
standards is often quoted as a justication for upholding a dominant position. See
Chapter 1 for specic examples.
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by allowing general demand and cost functions. As it turns out, an ex-
clusive focus on quality externalities to determine the equilibrium quality
is grossly misleading. Instead, it is shown that the provision of quality
depends on three distinct e¤ects that work in opposing directions. First,
the "demand e¤ect" lowers quality under integration: Because double
marginalization is overcome after integration, the product is sold to a
larger group of people. This implies that the average valuation of quality
decreases as customers with a smaller willingness to pay for a prod-
uct typically also tend to have a smaller willingness to pay for quality
improvements. Second, the "commitment e¤ect" increases quality un-
der integration: This e¤ect arises because independent upstream rms
strategically reduce the quality of their component in order to deter the
downstream rm from placing a high mark-up on the nal product. Fi-
nally, the "scale e¤ect" increases quality under integration: Because an
integrated rm increases output, the provision of quality is cheaper when-
ever it a¤ects the xed costs of production. These e¤ects are extensively
discussed in the chapter. This allows a deeper analysis of important ap-
plications of the model, including the producer/retailer relationship, the
intermediate good/nal good producer relationship and the provision of
promotional services by retailers.
The two following chapters contain models of political agency. In a
democracy, public o¢ cials are agents whose purpose it ultimately is to
serve the public interest by implementing the will of the electorate.3 This
has given rise to a eld of research which has aimed at explaining insti-
tutional outcomes at a positive level and proposing optimally designed
incentive contracts at the normative level.
Research focussing on the lower branches of government has often
emphasized the danger of corruption which arises because bureaucratic
3Arrow (1951) has forcefully demonstrated that it may not be obvious what "the
will of the electorate" actually is because the derivation of a social preference ordering
from individual preferences can be a delicate task. This is an issue this dissertation
will not be concerned with and it is assumed throughout that social preferences are
well dened.
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agents may have the power to extract rents from the people and rms
they deal with.4 Banerjee (1997) and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) in
particular have stressed that, due to informational asymmetries between
bureaucratic agents and their principals, the danger of misconduct is
inherent in any kind of state intervention into free markets. Therefore,
there exists a fundamental trade-o¤ between government intervention to
correct market failures on the one hand and accepting misgovernance on
the other.
Yet, even if one is willing to accept some degree of corruption as an
unpleasant by-product of government activity, one will still want to know
how to reduce corruption given the degree of state intervention. Much of
the discussion on this topic has centered around the use of competition
in bureaucracies (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Bliss and Di Tella, 1997,
and Ades and Di Tella , 1999). This branch of the literature has provided
a number of encouraging results which show how horizontal competition,
that is competition between bureaucrats that provide substitutable kinds
of public services, can mitigate the problem of corruption in much the
same way as competition between rms limits excessive pricing. It has
also stressed, however, that vertical competition, that is competition be-
tween bureaucrats that provide complementary kinds of public services,
will lead to excessive corruption in much the same way as vertical chains
overprice their respective components due to double marginalization. As
a consequence, levels of corruption arise that are too high not only from
a welfare perspective but also from the point of view of a corrupt bureau-
cracy. I.e., even if the government was corrupt it would want to reduce
uncoordinated corruption.
This gives rise to a disturbing puzzle: when vertical competition be-
tween bureaucrats is bad for everybody, why is it that it is such a per-
vasive phenomenon in many developing countries, where private activ-
4Important contributions include Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Banerjee (1997),
Ades and Di Tella (1999), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) and Svensson (2005). Surveys
are provided by Bardhan (1997) and Aidt (2003).
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ity often involves approval of dozens of di¤erent government agencies?5
Chapter 2 of this dissertation addresses this very question. It rst for-
malizes the informal arguments in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the central
paper in this eld, and derives a number of comparative statics results
that highlight the workings of vertical competition in corruption. The
model is then extended to allow for rent-extractors which are outside the
reach of the government but nevertheless harm private activity. This is
done because one of the distinguishing features of many corrupt soci-
eties is the prevalence of both organized crime and street crime, and the
ability of seemingly innocuous private organizations and interest groups
to extract rents.6 The central result of the chapter is that the govern-
ment may voluntarily refrain from coordinating its o¢ cials when they
set their bribe demands in order to be more aggressive in the ght for
rents against outsiders even though this limits the overall graft income
that can be extracted from the private sector. Therefore, the observed
level of vertical competition in corrupt societies may not be an accidental
form of ine¢ cient governance, but expression of the deliberate intent to
collect graft income.
The political economy research that has focussed on the higher
branches of government has typically pursued a di¤erent direction,
namely the provision of incentives for politicians via elections.7 These
papers are much in the spirit of managerial agency models that explain
how optimal contracts can solve problems like moral hazard, adverse se-
lection or multitasking.8 Yet, despite the apparent similarities between
those elds, real world incentive schemes for politicians take quite a di¤er-
5See De Soto (2000) for discouraging anecdotal evidence.
6See Chapter 2 for examples.
7Important contributions include Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997), Besley and Burgess (2002), Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Mess-
ner and Polborn (2004). See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) for
surveys.
8Among the many contributions see in particular Holmström (1979), Grossman
and Hart (1983), Hart (1983) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991). Prendergast
(1999) is an excellent survey of the topic.
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ent form than the typical incentive contract for a manager. In particular,
"employment contracts" for politicians usually involve unconditional ap-
pointment for a xed amount of time (the length of a term) during which
the agents are not subject to any kind of evaluation.9 Managers, on the
other hand, can usually be dismissed instantaneously after bad perfor-
mance (possibly at the expense of having to pay a contractually specied
compensation). The literatures stance towards this institutional detail
has been to take it as given. This is unsatisfying for two reasons. First,
one would like to know why the public restricts itself by committing
not to oust politicians for a given period of time especially since re-
call elections in California have shown that instantaneous evaluation of
politicians is practically feasible. Second, this commitment is the very
source of ine¢ ciency in the seminal model of political agency which was
developed by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997). Introducing the possibility of recall elections would re-
store the rst best in this model, invalidating the negative conclusions
the authors draw.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation tries to derive the structure of political
terms from rst principles by setting up a dynamic principal-agent model
where reference to a specic context enters only via a parameter that
measures the contractibility of outcomes. My interpretation of the model
is that high contractibility refers to a situation of managerial agency (as
rm success is often readily measurable) while low contractibility refers
to a situation of political agency (as political outcomes are often vague
and di¢ cult to describe ex-ante).
In the model, a principal faces a sorting problem, since agents are of
di¤erent ability, and a moral hazard problem, as the agents investments
incentives may not be aligned with the public interest. The central result
of the chapter is that the principal may want to commit not to displace
9Although this constitutional form is typical in almost all democratic administra-
tions around the world, there is the notable exception of some US states, including the
State of California, where recall elections are possible. With this provision, politicians
are subject to evaluation at any instant.
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the agent for a given period of time in order to implement the e¢ cient
investment decision whenever contractibility is low. If contractibility is
high, however, such commitment will never be optimal as explicit incen-
tives can achieve the desired behavior in this case. This explains why
xed terms are prevalent in the sphere of politics while they are rarely
found in the private sector.
Chapter 4, nally, deals with the provision of product characteris-
tics in a specic market, the market for insurance. All major insurance
markets in the world are regulated, particularly with regard to rms
capital resources and the composition of their asset portfolio. Typically,
insurance companies have to provide a minimum capital level (which in
practice may depend on specic rm characteristics like the size of the
customer base and the types of insurance contracts that are sold). In
addition to that, many regulators restrict the investments that insurance
companies can make into risky assets like stocks, options or futures (at
least if these investments are speculative and do not have the purpose of
hedging other risks).
The early literature on insurance regulation (e.g., Borch, 1981, Munch
and Smallwood, 1981, and Finsinger and Pauly, 1984) has given a the-
oretical foundation for this type of regulation by noting that insurance
rms have an incentive to underprovide capital by cashing out reserves
that should protect their customersrisks. Rees, Gravelle and Wambach
(1999) have shown that this result rests on the heroic assumption that
insurance demand is exogenous and independent of the nancial health
of an insurance company. They demonstrate that providing consumers
with information on the nancial strength of insurance rms restores an
e¢ cient capital level and investment policy because high risk rms would
simply attract no demand.
While maintaining the assumption of rational consumer choice, Chap-
ter 4 improves upon previous approaches by setting up a new model of
the insurance market that reects important market details. First, it
allows for consumer heterogeneity, which will be shown to be a source of
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ine¢ ciency in the market, while previous models have essentially been
one-consumer models. Second, it introduces imperfect capital markets
which generates a cost of holding capital. The chapter shows that an
insurance rm with market power has an incentive to underprovide cap-
ital and to invest too much into risky assets. The origin of the e¤ect is
similar to Spence (1975) and Sheshinskis (1976) nding that a product
market monopolist will not provide the e¢ cient amount of product qual-
ity. In both cases, rms are concerned with marginal consumers more
than with intramarginal consumers. As the marginal insurance buyer
desires a lower capital level and riskier investments than intramarginal
consumers, the result follows. The chapter then goes on to show that the
implementation of the optimal level of capital and investments necessi-
tates not only regulation of these variables, but also setting a price cap.
If price regulation is not desired or not feasible, it may be the case that
any insolvency regulation decreases welfare because it induces rms to
raise prices by too much.
Chapter 1
Successive Monopolies with
Endogenous Quality
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1.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the impact of vertical integration on product
choice in supply chains with market power. In particular, it tries to
shed light on the question how product quality is a¤ected by the market
structure.
In antitrust cases, defendants often argue that a vertically integrated
rm provides a higher level of product quality than separate entities.
During the process of privatizing the German railway, for instance,
Deutsche Bahn contended that a vertical separation of railway system
and passenger transport should be avoided to maintain quality. Similarly,
in Hilti v. European Commission, the Hilti Corporation, a producer of
nail guns used in construction, held that its guns should only be loaded
with cartridges containing its own nails because potential downstream
competitors allegedly produced inferior components of a dangerous na-
ture.
These arguments nd support in the theoretical literature. Tirole
(1988) argues that in the provision of retailersservices that make the
manufacturers good more attractive to consumers, there is downstream
moral hazard in the sense that retailers do not take the positive ex-
ternality into account that service provision exerts on producers. This
suggests that independent retailers provide a lower service level than ver-
tically integrated rms. In a more complete model, Economides (1999)
indeed nds that vertical integration of successive monopolies increases
the provision of quality.
It turns out, however, that Economidess (1999) result largely rests
on a number of specic assumptions concerning demand, costs and the
timing of pricing. While the particular situation he describes ts well for
the special case of two complementary network goods that are provided
in a horizontal structure, it may be less suited to analyze regular vertical
chains (like the relationships between a manufacturer and a retailer or
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between an intermediate good and a nal good producer).1 This, how-
ever, is the focus of this chapter and as will be shown below, quality may
in general be increased or decreased by integration, depending on the
structure of the problem.
Moreover, it will be shown that Tiroles (1988, p. 178) focus on
the service externality is misleading as an independent retailer actually
provides a higher level of services than an integrated rm. In fact this
higher level of services is e¢ cient in the sense that it maximizes joint
prots of manufacturer and retailer despite the existence of a service
externality.
Section 1.2 presents a model of successive monopolies with endoge-
nous quality choice that improves on previous approaches by allowing
general demand and cost functions. In contrast to Economides (1999)
rms act sequentially and not simultaneously. While this complicates
matters technically, it better suits the description of a vertically related
industry. As in the previous literature, quality choice will be driven by
the impact of double marginalization. The level of quality is shown to
depend on three distinct e¤ects which are separately analyzed in Sections
1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. Section 1.6 contains some welfare analysis. Section 1.7
discusses a number of extensions and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Consider the market for a vertically di¤erentiated product which is char-
acterized by its quality q  0. Demand at price p is given by the func-
tion x(p; q) with inverse p(x; q). Assume that p() is smooth in both
arguments and that px(x; q) < 0 and pq(x; q) > 0 for all x and q, where
subscripts denote partial derivatives. Moreover, it will be assumed that
pxq(x; q) < 0, implying that consumers with a higher willingness to pay
1See Economides (1996, p. 690) for a discussion of how his paper relates to the
general literature on network externalities.
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for the product also have a larger preference for quality.2
The good is produced in a vertical production process which consists
of a monopoly upstream rm (indexed by 1) and a monopoly downstream
rm (indexed by 2), which may or may not be vertically integrated. The
upstream rm rst produces an intermediate good of quality q1  0 which
it sells at transfer price pt to the downstream rm. The downstream rm
in turn produces the nal good by choosing a quality q2  0 to rene the
input.3 The good is then sold to the market at price p. The nal quality
q is determined by the quality levels provided by the two rms, so that
q = q(q1; q2), where it is assumed that q() is weakly increasing in both
q1 and q2. Firms i = 1; 2 have smooth cost functions Ci(x; qi) which are
strictly increasing in both arguments. Throughout the chapter, it will be
assumed that second order conditions hold to guarantee the existence of
a solution.
In the general form presented here, the equilibrium of the model is
determined by several interacting e¤ects. As a consequence, stubbornly
solving the rmsmaximization problems yields little in the way of un-
derstanding the structure of the solution. We will therefore proceed by
an alternative route, identifying the three distinct e¤ects that govern the
relationship between vertical integration and product quality. Table 1.1
gives a summary of the e¤ects and whether they tend to increase or de-
crease quality under integration. As can be seen there, the rst of the
three e¤ects is always present, while the second and the third e¤ect only
appear under specic circumstances. Section 1.3 will rst analyze the
model under the assumption that those circumstances are not fullled.
It will be demonstrated that in this case, indeed, quality under integra-
tion is lower than with separate rms. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 then add
2For most circumstances this is a natural assumption which is routinely made
in the literature on price discrimination (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Section 1.7
discusses how the results of the paper change when instead pxq(x; q) > 0.
3While the model is formulated here as an intermediate/nal good producer re-
lationship, it can equivalently be interpreted as a manufacturer/retailer relationship
with wholesale price pt.
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the characteristics needed for the second and third e¤ect, demonstrating
that both tend to increase the quality under integration. As will be seen,
this separation of e¤ects will allow us to study important special cases of
vertical chains like the manufacturer/retailer relationship, the interme-
diate/nal good producer relationship and the provision of promotional
services.
E¤ects Direction Occurrence
1.3 Demand E¤ect   always
1.4 Commitment E¤ect + Condition 1.1 does not hold
1.5 Scale E¤ect + Condition 1.2 does not hold
Table 1.1: Quality E¤ects
1.3 The Demand E¤ect
We will rst analyze the problem under conditions that ensure that the
second and third e¤ect are absent. These conditions turn out to be that
the upstream rm has no impact on quality and that the cost of quality
provision does not decrease with the scale of production. More formally,
we will assume the following in this section.
Condition 1.1 @q=@q1 = 0.
Condition 1.2 @C
i=@qi
x
 @2Ci
@qi@x
for i = 1; 2.
Condition 1 of course implies that q1 = 0 in equilibrium so that
q = q(0; q2). Without loss of generality, we let the downstream rm
choose q directly, setting q2 = q, so we have downstream investment.
To get a clearer picture which types of cost functions satisfy Condition
2, consider the cost structure with xed costs F (q) and marginal costs
c(q). If the provision of quality only increases c, then indeed the costs of
providing quality do not decrease with the scale of production. If quality
provision also increases F , however, Condition 2 is not met.
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The conditions laid out in this section correspond to an intermedi-
ate/nal good producer relationship in industries with large scale pro-
duction. Manufacturers buy a homogeneous input from the upstream
rm which is then rened to a nal product. As the good is already pro-
duced at a signicant scale, further increases in the volume of production
do not make the provision of quality cheaper. As an example, one could
think of a car manufacturer that buys steel as an input.
We will begin by analyzing the equilibrium under the vertically inte-
grated structure. In that case the integrated rms prot function is
 = xp(x; q)  C1(x)  C2(x; q).
Maximizing prots with respect to x and q gives
@
@x
= p+ xpx   C1x   C2x = 0 (1.1)
and
@
@q
= xpq   C2q = 0. (1.2)
The corresponding second order conditions are
@2
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C1xx   C2xx < 0, (1.3)
@2
@q2
= xpqq   C2qq < 0, (1.4)
and
@2
@x2
@2
@q2
 

@2
@x@q
2
= (2px + xpxx   C1xx   C2xx) (1.5)
(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2 > 0.
The solution is characterized by the usual equality of marginal cost
and marginal revenue on the one hand, and of marginal willingness to
pay for quality and marginal cost of quality on the other hand.
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Next, we will turn to the disintegrated solution. Under separation,
the downstream rms prot function is
2 = x [p(x; q)  pt]  C2(x; q).
Taking the transfer price pt as given, rm 2 maximizes its prot with
respect to x and q. This yields
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   pt   C2x = 0 (1.6)
and
@2
@q
= xpq   C2q = 0. (1.7)
The corresponding second order conditions are
@22
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C2xx < 0, (1.8)
@22
@q2
= xpqq   C2qq < 0, (1.9)
and
@22
@x2
@22
@q2
 

@22
@x@q
2
= (2px + xpxx   C2xx) (1.10)
(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2 > 0.
In the rst stage, the upstream rm chooses the transfer price pt,
anticipating the downstream rms marketing decision x(pt) in the second
stage. Its prot function therefore is
1 = x(pt)pt   C1(x(pt)).
The optimal transfer price is then determined by the rst order condition
@1
@pt
=
dx
dpt

pt   C1x(x(pt))

+ x = 0. (1.11)
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Comparing the two regimes, Proposition 1.1 arrives at the following
result.
Proposition 1.1 Assume Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Then successive
monopolies provide a higher level of quality than a vertically integrated
rm. Given output, quality is such that joint prots are maximized.
Proof. Note rst that if the upstream rm were to sell her input at
marginal costs (pt = C1x), then equations (1.1) and (1.2) would be identi-
cal to equations (1.6) and (1.7) and the integrated and the disintegrated
solution would fall together. As marginal cost pricing results in zero
prots, however, it is straightforward to see that we must have pt > C1x.
Applying the implicit function theorem to equations (1.6) and (1.7) then
yields
dq
dpt
=  
 @
22
@x2
@22
@x@pt
@22
@x@q
@22
@q@pt
 =
 @
22
@x2
@22
@x@q
@22
@x@q
@22
@q2
 (1.12)
=  
pq + xpxq   C2xq
(2px + xpxx   C2xx)(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2
> 0.
where (1.10) and the fact that by (1.7) pq   C2xq = C2q =x  C2xq  0 (this
is Condition 1.2) have been used to determine the sign. Hence, pt > C1x
implies that q is higher under non-integration than under integration.
For the second part of the proposition, rst observe that the level
of quality that maximizes joint prots for a given x is dened by (1.2).
Noting that the actual quality choice by the independent downstream
rm is given by (1.7) which is identical to (1.2) completes the proof. 
The fact that disintegrated rms provide a higher level of quality has
a simple intuition. Since the seller of the input good is an independent
monopolist, he will charge a transfer price above marginal costs. The
result is double marginalization which causes a restriction of output.
Since a more exclusive group of consumers is served, there is an incentive
to adjust the level of quality upwards.
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As we have downstream investment here, the model is useful to evalu-
ate the question whether retailers fall short of providing e¢ cient services
for the products they sell. In general, an upstream producer will worry
that a retailer does not put enough e¤ort into promotional activities.
This problem has been termed downstreammoral hazard by Tirole (1988)
who shows that the retailer exerts a positive externality on the producer
(increased services lead to higher demand for the producers products).
As the retailer does not internalize this externality, the provided service
quality is too low given the input price.
The existence of this quality-reducing externality and the term "moral
hazard" suggest that independent retailers provide less services than a
vertically integrated monopolist. Whether this is actually the case can
readily be analyzed within the scope of this section as Tiroles formulation
is a special case of the more general model presented here, satisfying both
Conditions 1.1 and 1.2. Following Proposition 1.1, the surprising result
is that despite the fact that they do not take the positive externality
into account that they exert on producers, independent retailers provide
a higher level of promotional services
The reason for this is that there is an externality taking the input
price pt as given. However, it is of little use to take an endogenous vari-
able in a dynamic game as exogenously given, as it is chosen strategically
to a¤ect the subsequent actions of other players. So in fact, the exter-
nality between retailer and producer is no source for downstream moral
hazard. As Proposition 1.1 demonstrates, retailers really provide a level
of services that maximizes joint prots.4
4Note, however, that in models with more than one retailer as in Mathewson and
Winter (1984, 1993), retailers may exert positive externalities on each other. This
happens, for instance, if one retailers advertising for a product increases another
retailers demand for the product. In this case, of course, retailers may underprovide
promotional activities.
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1.4 The Commitment E¤ect
We will now relax Condition 1.1 to show that if it does not hold, a
second e¤ect appears that inuences the quality provision of independent
monopolists. For simplicity, we will consider a situation where only the
upstream rms investment is relevant for the overall level of quality.
Corresponding to last sections procedure, it will therefore be assumed
that q = q(q1; 0) = q1. As will become clear below, the results carry over
to the general case where q2 is also relevant. In addition to tractability,
this approach has the advantage that it represents an important special
case, namely the situation where a manufacturer sells its products via a
retailer (who does not provide extensive services).
The vertically integrated solution is again given by equations (1.1) to
(1.5), with the cost functionsindices exchanged as the quality investment
is now made by rm one instead of rms two.5
If the two rms are independent, the downstream rms prot func-
tion is
2 = x [p(x; q)  pt]  C2(x).
Given an input good of price pt and quality q, it will therefore set the
quantity such that
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   pt   C2x = 0. (1.13)
The corresponding second order condition is
@22
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C2xx < 0. (1.14)
The upstream rms prot function is
1 = x(pt; q)pt   C1(x(pt; q); q).
5The correspondingly altered equations will be referred to as equations (1.1a) to
(1.5a) in what follows.
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The optimal choice of pt and q is then given by
@1
@pt
=
dx
dpt

pt   C1x(x(pt; q); q)

+ x = 0 (1.15)
and
@1
@q
=
dx
dq

pt   C1x(x(pt; q); q)

  C1q (x(pt; q); q) = 0. (1.16)
Comparing these two solution we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2 Assume Condition 1.2 holds. Then successive monop-
olies provide a higher level of quality (if the demand e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong) or a lower level of quality (if the commitment e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong) than a vertically integrated rm. Given output, quality is below
the level that maximizes joint prots.
Proof. The most convenient way of proving this proposition is by way
of graphical representation of the equilibrium. We will rst depict the
vertically integrated equilibrium in (x; q) space. The equilibrium point
is represented by the intersection of the two curves that are dened by
equations (1.1a) and (1.2a). Using the implicit function theorem, the
curve @=@x = 0 is found to have the slope
dq
dx

@=@x=0
=  
@2
@x2
@2
@x@q
=  2px + xpxx   C
1
xx   C2xx
pq + xpxq   C1xq
. (1.17)
Likewise, the curve @=@q = 0 has slope
dq
dx

@=@q=0
=  
@2
@x@q
@2
@q2
=  
pq + xpxq   C1xq
xpqq   C1qq
. (1.18)
By (1.3a), the numerator of (1.17) is negative and by (1.4a) the denomi-
nator of (1.18) is also smaller than zero at the equilibrium point. Hence,
around the equilibrium, the slope of both curves has the same sign as
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium with upstream investment
@2=(@x@q). By (1.2a), pq C1xq = C1q =x C1xq  0, where the inequality
follows from Condition 1.2. Therefore, we must have @2=(@x@q) < 0
so both curves are downward sloping. Comparing (1.17) and (1.18),
one nds that the curve @=@x = 0 is strictly steeper than the curve
@=@q = 0 if and only if
@2
@x2
@2
@q2
>

@2
@x@q
2
.
Around the equilibrium we know this to be the case from (1.5a). Ac-
cordingly, Figure 1.1 represents the solution with the curve @=@x = 0
falling steeper than the curve @=@q = 0. Next we will determine how
the curves shift under independent pricing. From (1.15) we rst obtain
pt =  
x
dx
dpt
+ C1x. (1.19)
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Substituting (1.19) into (1.13) gives
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   C1x   C2x +
x
dx
dpt
= 0 (1.20)
which is the curve @2=@x = 0 that describes the choice of x under
disintegration. Note that (1.20) is exactly equal to (1.1a) with x=(dx=dpt)
added. The sign of this expression is equal to the sign of
dx
dpt
=  
@22
@x@pt
@22
@x2
=
1
2px + xpxx   C2xx
< 0 (1.21)
which is derived by applying the implicit function theorem to (1.13).
In view of (1.20) the question is: given some value of q, how must x
be changed in equation (1.1a) to yields a positive expression such that
(1.20) is fullled? As @2=@x2 < 0 by (1.3a), it turns out that x must
be decreased. Hence, the curve @2=@x = 0 lies to the left of the curve
@=@x = 0 as depicted in Figure 1.1. This is the demand e¤ect of
independent quality provision: as is apparent from the graphical repre-
sentation, it increases q and decreases x. The curve that describes the
choice of q under disintegration is found by substituting (1.19) in (1.16)
which yields
@1
@q
=  dx
dq
x
dx
dpt
  C1q = 0. (1.22)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (1.13) again we nd that
dx
dq
=  
@22
@x@q
@22
@x2
=   pq + xpxq
2px + xpxx   C2xx
.
Noting that this expression is equal to  (pq + xpxq) dxdpt and substituting
it into (1.22) then gives
@1
@q
= xpq   C1q + x2pxq = 0. (1.23)
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Note that (1.23) is exactly equal to (1.2a) with x2pxq < 0 added. The
question here is, howmust q be changed in (1.2a) while holding x constant
such that (1.2a) yields something positive, thereby fullling (1.23). As
@2=@q2 < 0 by (1.4a), it turns out that a decrease in q is necessary.
This is represented in Figure 1.1 by the fact that the curve @1=@q = 0
lies below the curve @=@q = 0. This is the commitment e¤ect which
is seen to decrease q and to increase x. Obviously, the exact position of
q under disintegration depends on the relative strength of demand and
commitment e¤ect.
Finally, the second part of the proposition has to be demonstrated.
Given an arbitrary x the level of q that maximizes joint prots is im-
plicitly dened by (1.2a), yielding pq   C1q =x = 0. Note, however, that
rearranging (1.23), the quality that is provided under disintegration can
be described by the equation pq   C1q =x = xpxq < 0. Using (1.4a) we
therefore arrive at the conclusion that q is smaller than the amount that
maximizes joint prots. 
Proposition 1.2 shows that when there is upstream investment, two
e¤ects govern the quality provision of an independent upstream rm.
First, there is the demand e¤ect that tends to increase quality in the
disintegrated case for the same reason as in the last section. Anticipat-
ing double marginalization, the manufacturer increases quality as goods
will be sold to a more exclusive class of consumers. Second, and new
in this section, is the commitment e¤ect. As the quality level is chosen
before the retailer decides on its markup, the quality level can be set
strategically in order to inuence the extent of double marginalization
downstream. In order to prevent the downstream rm from demanding
a high margin, the upstream rm strategically reduces the level of qual-
ity. The manufacturer e¤ectively produces a mass product (in terms of
quality) in order to commit the retailer not to market it as a luxury good
(in terms of quantity).
Note that this commitment introduces an ine¢ ciency into the pro-
vision of quality. The upstream rms behavior here is akin to what a
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social planner does in a second best world: when there is a distortion in
one dimension of the market (here the price-distortion caused by double
marginalization), it becomes optimal to introduce a distortion in a sec-
ond dimension (here by reducing quality). Note also that the result of
Proposition 1.2 immediately carries over to the more general case where
both q1 and q2 are important: if quality may be higher or lower under in-
tegration without downstream investment, it may also be higher or lower
with downstream investment.
Economides (1999) nds that under the specic assumptions of his
model, independent rms demand a higher price than an integrated rm,
even if they provide lower quality. In general, however, this property does
not hold. It is easy to nd examples where the commitment e¤ect is so
strong that the market price p is lower under disintegration despite the
presence of double marginalization. That is, double marginalization may
actually decrease prices once quality is endogenous.
From the proof of Proposition 1.2 one can see that the demand e¤ect
is particularly strong when demand is more concave (less convex). Intu-
itively this corresponds to a situation where a relatively large proportion
of consumers has a high willingness to pay. The commitment e¤ect will
be important whenever pxq is large, implying that quality reductions are
particularly e¤ective in deterring retailers from going upmarket. In or-
der to be able to get a more direct feel for the relative impact of the two
e¤ects, it may, however, be desirable to refer to a concrete special case
that illustrates when the model tips from a lower to a higher choice of
quality. Proposition 1.3 provides such a case.
Proposition 1.3 Assume that both rms have a constant returns to
scale technology. Then, if the demand function is linear in the price,
successive monopolies with upstream investment provide the same level
of quality as a vertically integrated rm.
Proof. The requirement of constant returns to scale implies that the
cost functions are of the form C1(x; q) = xc1(q) and C2(x) = xc2, where
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c2 is a constant. Linearity in p implies that inverse demand takes the
form p = a(q)x + b(q) for some functions a(q) and b(q). Using these
demand and cost functions, it is straightforward to show that (1.1a) now
corresponds to
2a(q)x+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0 (1.24)
and that (1.2a) corresponds to
x =
c01(q)  b0(q)
a0(q)
. (1.25)
Likewise, (1.13) is given by
4a(q)x+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0 (1.26)
and (1.16) by
x =
c01(q)  b0(q)
2a0(q)
. (1.27)
Substituting (1.24) in (1.25) and rearranging or (1.26) in (1.27) and re-
arranging both yields
2a(q)
c01(q)  b0(q)
a0(q)
+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0, (1.28)
which is a function of q alone. Thus, the level of quality produced by
independent rms is identical to the level that a vertically integrated
manufacturer provides. 
Proposition 1.3 tells us that with constant returns and linear demand,
a producer with an independent retailer is equivalent to a vertically inte-
grated manufacturer in terms of quality provision.6 ;7 The acquisition of
6While the signicance of this example should not be stressed too much, linearity
may be more than a convenient focal point of the analysis. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1985) estimate manufacturer and retailer margins in the car industry and can not
reject the hypothesis that the demand functions for the large number of models they
consider are linear.
7The result of Proposition 3.3 readily extends to the class of cost functions of
Successive Monopolies with Endogenous Quality 24
a retailer by a producer will therefore only a¤ect the retail price but not
the product as such. Note that only linearity in p is required, so that
demand and cost functions are generally allowed to be non-linear in q.
This is important because the scaling of q can only be sensibly dened
up to a positive monotone transformation, which would render linearity
requirements void.
1.5 The Scale E¤ect
After showing that a relaxation of Condition 1.1 can alter Section 1.3s
conclusion that independent rms always provide more quality, we will
now see that the same result can be obtained if instead Condition 1.2
is relaxed. Contrary to Section 1.3, we therefore assume that the cost
function is such that quality investments become cheaper with scale.
That is, the per unit costs of producing a given level of quality decreases
with the number of units that are produced.
Obviously, Section 1.3s rst order conditions still apply in this sec-
tion. The equilibrium characteristics implied by them, however, change
as Condition 1.2 can not be applied anymore. This is stated in Proposi-
tion 1.4.
Proposition 1.4 Assume Condition 1.1 holds. Then successive monop-
olies provide a higher level of quality (if the demand e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong) or a lower level of quality (if the scale e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong)
than a vertically integrated rm. Given output, quality is such that joint
prots are maximized.
Proof. The proof is immediate by following the proof of Proposition
1.1 step by step and noting that the numerator of dq=dpt is now inde-
the form C = F + c(q)x, which nests all constant returns functions. The latter were
chosen in the proposition merely because of their particular importance in the long
run.
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terminate in sign as xpxq < 0, while pq   C2xq = C2q =x   C2xq > 0 since
Condition 1.2 does not hold. 
The scale e¤ect that is introduced here by assuming that Condition
1.2 does not hold tends to decrease the quality that independent rms
provide. The reason is straightforward. Double marginalization reduces
the quantity sold. But as the provision of quality becomes more costly
when production is at a smaller scale, the downstream rm chooses to
o¤er less of it.
The strength of the scale e¤ect is directly determined by the charac-
teristics of the cost function. Most importantly, if the provision of quality
tends to increase xed cost, the scale e¤ect will be important, while it will
be of less relevance if quality provision predominantly a¤ects marginal
costs.
1.6 Welfare
The analysis so far has been positive, describing in some detail how
vertical integration inuences product choice. In this section, we will
now turn to the normative question whether vertical integration is de-
sirable from a welfare point of view. There are two parts to this. First,
vertical integration allows to overcome double marginalization which is
unambiguously desirable as prices are decreased and prots increased.
Second, however, we must consider the impact of integration on quality.
As Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) have shown, if output is taken as
given, monopolies provide too little quality from a welfare point of view
when pxq < 0. Hence, whenever higher quality levels can be achieved
under disintegration, this makes integration less attractive. In princi-
ple, therefore, the general wisdom that vertical integration of successive
monopolies is benecial could loose its validity once the endogeneity of
product characteristics is acknowledged.
To analyze this question formally, let us begin by inspecting the mar-
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ket solution of Chapter 1.3, where Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. The
welfare function W (x; q) consists of gross consumer surplus minus the
costs of production.
W (x; q) =
xZ
0
p(z; q)dz   C1(x)  C2(x; q) (1.29)
Maximizing (1.29) with respect to x and q gives the rst order conditions
@W
@x
= p(x; q)  C1x   C2x = 0 (1.30)
and
@W
@q
=
xZ
0
pq(z; q)dz   C2q = 0. (1.31)
with the associated second order conditions
@2W
@x2
= px   C1xx   C2xx < 0, (1.32)
@2W
@q2
=
xZ
0
pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq < 0 (1.33)
and
@2W
@x2
@2W
@q2
 

@2W
@x@q
2
= (px   C1xx   C2xx) (1.34)

24 xZ
0
pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq
35  (pq   C2xq)2 > 0.
It will again be useful to depict the optimum graphically. Figure 1.2
shows it as the intersection of the curves Wx = 0 and Wq = 0, which
are given by (1.30) and (1.31). To prove that both curves are indeed
downward sloping around the optimum, the implicit function theorem is
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Figure 1.2: Welfare comparison
applied to (1.30) and (1.31) to yield
dq
dx

@W=@x=0
=  
@2W
@x2
@2W
@x@q
=  px   C
1
xx   C2xx
pq   C2xq
< 0 (1.35)
and
dq
dx

@W=@x=0
=  
@2W
@x@q
@2W
@q2
=  
pq   C2xqR x
0
pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq
< 0. (1.36)
The negative signs can be inferred from (1.32), (1.33) and the fact that
@2W=(@x@q) = pq   C2xq < 0. To see that this latter cross-derivative is
negative rst note that by Condition 1.2, C2xq  C2q =x. By (1.31) in turn,
C2q =x =
R x
0
pq(z; q)dz

=x. As pxq < 0 by assumption, we must also haveR x
0
pq(z; q)dz

=x > pq. Thus, C2xq > pq, the desired result.
Comparing the relative slopes of (1.35) and (1.36), we immediately
nd that the curve Wx = 0 is steeper than the curve Wq = 0 by (1.34)
as depicted in Figure 1.2, which completes the picture for the welfare
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optimum.
Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1.2 we can also represent
the integrated and separated monopoly solution graphically, which are
depicted in Figure 1.2 as the intersection of the curves x = 0 and q = 0
for the integrated case and 2x = 0 and q = 0 for the disintegrated case.
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Proposition 1.2 allows to
demonstrate that the three monopoly curves indeed lie strictly below the
respective welfare curves.
In order to compare the welfare properties of the integrated and dis-
integrated solution, Figure 1.2 shows the iso-welfare contours that pass
through the monopoly solutions. The contours are drawn such that
welfare is higher under integration than under separation (the better-
direction is inwards), but it is easy to see that this will in general depend
on their specic shape.
The slope of the iso-welfare contour passing through an arbitrary
point (x; q) can be derived as
dq
dx

W=W (x;q)
=  @W=@x
@W=@q
=   p(x; q)  C
1
x   C2xR x
0
pq(z; q)dz   C2q
(1.37)
by using (1.30) and (1.31). Somewhat unfortunately, this expression
(which primarily consists of rst order derivatives) seems quite unrelated
to the slopes of the other curves in the gure (which primarily consist of
second order derivatives). Hence, no meaningful assertion can be made
about the relative positions of the two iso-welfare contours, even if one
were able to deduce other properties of them (e.g., that their upper con-
tour sets are convex).8
The author is hesitant to conclude from this seeming indeterminacy of
the relative positions of the iso-welfare contours that a welfare improve-
8It can be shown (by using the rst order conditions of the respective maximization
problems) that both contours have a negative slope at the two equilibrium points, but
this is not inconsistent with the possibility that welfare can be higher or lower under
disintegration.
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ment through vertical separation must in general be possible. The main
reason for this is that in a simplied two-type version of the model, it can
be shown that welfare under integration is always higher.9 A number of
simulations have been run to nd an example for a welfare improvement
through separation but alas to no avail.
1.7 Extensions and Discussion
This section will discuss a number of aspects of the basic model and
analyze some important extensions.
Double Marginalization
In the basic model, the driving force behind the quality provision
of successive monopolies is double marginalization. In principle, con-
tractual solutions exist that prevent double marginalization and so one
may wonder why rms not simply write optimal nonlinear contracts that
implement the integrated allocation.
The problem with those schemes, however (and the reason why con-
tractual solutions are often ruled out in the literature), is that they fail
to prevent double marginalization in settings that are more realistic than
the idealized textbook exhibition of vertically related markets. For in-
stance, note that nonlinear pricing schemes leave all potential risk with
the downstream rm if demand is uncertain. Transferring some of the
risk to the upstream rm then necessarily involves a wholesale price above
marginal costs (Rey and Tirole, 1986), so double marginalization reap-
pears. But even if it were optimal for the downstream rm to carry the
whole risk, pricing above marginal costs would still be necessary if there
is asymmetric information between the rms concerning future demand
conditions (Gallini and Wright, 1990). Moreover, a variety of historical
and regulatory reasons make coordination di¢ cult (see Smith, 1982). Ti-
role (1988, p. 176-177) contains a discussion and further arguments why
9This model is available from the author upon request.
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contractual solutions will in general not make it possible to eradicate
double marginalization.10
What Happens if pxq > 0?
The assumption that pxq < 0 was needed at several points in the
chapter. It turns out that, if one assumes instead that pxq > 0, the
direction of the demand e¤ect and the commitment e¤ect change signs.
In fact, the output contraction that is caused by double marginalization
would lead rms to decrease quality because consumers with a higher
willingness to pay then have a lower preference for quality. As a result,
upstream rms would have an incentive to increase quality in order to
stop downstream rms from restricting output to luxury consumers. The
scale e¤ect, on the other hand, is not a¤ected by the sign of pxq.
Ex-ante Investments
In the basic model it was assumed that rms make their choice of
quality at the same time they decide on their price. This is certainly
the right order of events in many vertical chains. In others, it may be
more realistic to assume that rms rst simultaneously decide on the
level of quality they want to o¤er and then start a sequential pricing
game. This is the case whenever quality choice is determined by long-
standing investments, for example by the construction of a particular
type of production plant or the acquisition of a certain machine.
In the situation analyzed in Section 1.4, where the upstream rm
provides quality, obviously nothing changes as the upstream rm moves
rst anyhow. The case of downstream investment analyzed in Section
1.3, however, does change. When the downstream rm makes her qual-
ity choice prior to the upstream rms price decision, the level of quality
can be selected strategically to prevent excessive pricing by the upstream
rm. So, maybe not surprisingly, the upstream rm will consider the
10These theoretical arguments are supported by a number of empirical studies that
provide evidence for double marginalization in di¤erent industries. See, for instance,
Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Lafontaine (1995) and West (2000).
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commitment e¤ect. In this case Proposition 1.3, which shows that inte-
gration does not a¤ect quality in linear environments, can be extended
to the case of downstream investment. In general, quality may be higher
or lower under integration, depending on the same three e¤ects that were
illustrated in the basic model.
Price Discrimination
As consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for quality, it pays
for rms to price discriminate between them by o¤ering di¤erent quali-
ties. This, however, does not change the general intuition of the e¤ects
that are analyzed in this chapter. In fact, it can be shown that the results
of the basic model qualitatively carry over to the case of price discrimina-
tion. For instance, the demand e¤ect implies that successive monopolies
provide a smaller range of qualities containing only higher levels of qual-
ity. Likewise, the commitment e¤ect implies that independent rms sell
a larger range of qualities, also containing lower levels of quality.
1.8 Conclusion
Economides (1999) has shown that under certain conditions, successive
monopolies provide a lower level of quality and demand a higher price
than a vertically integrated monopolist.11 As it turned out, however, both
results do not hold in general. This chapter has presented a framework
to analyze vertical quality provision. It was shown that the choice of
quality is governed by three distinct e¤ects which were isolated in the
model. This has allowed us to provide a more nuanced view at important
special cases like the intermediate/nal good producer relationship, the
producer/retailer relationship and the provision of promotional services.
11The precise conditions are that consumersutility functions are linear in price
and quality, that there are no variable costs of production, that the two rmsqualities
are perfect complements, that rms invest in product choice before setting prices and
that prices are chosen simultaneously.
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It would be interesting to extend the model to a competitive down-
stream industry, with downstream rms o¤ering di¤erentiated products
as in Perry and Gro¤ (1985) and Kühn and Vives (1999). Likewise, a
further investigation into the simultaneous provision of quality by up-
stream and downstream rms could be rewarding. This would allow to
characterize the impact of di¤erent production technologies q(q1; q2) on
equilibrium quality (e.g., complementary versus substitutable qualities).
Both directions appear to be promising avenues for future research.
Chapter 2
Uncoordinated Corruption as
an Equilibrium Phenomenon
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2.1 Introduction
In an inuential paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that the problem
of bureaucratic corruption is particularly harmful when di¤erent public
agencies independently demand bribes for their service. This uncoordi-
nated corruption leads to signicantly higher bribe levels than coordi-
nated corruption since the agencies exert a negative externality on each
other that is not internalized. The e¤ect is comparable to the double
marginalization problem that arises when independent monopolists of
complementary goods overprice their respective components.
Uncoordinated rent extraction has devastating consequences for eco-
nomic development. Landes (1998) argues that it is one of the main
reasons why continental Europe was lagging behind England at the start
of the Industrial Revolution. Bardhan (1997), De Soto (1989) and Klit-
gaard (1990) make similar points for bureaucratic corruption in present
day Asia, Latin America and Africa. In many sub-Saharan countries
in particular, the extent of independent corruption is so pervasive that
economic development in the formal sector seems hard to sustain.
A simple response to the problem is reducing competition between
bureaucrats who issue complementary permits and licenses. If all neces-
sary documents can be obtained out of one hand (or if di¤erent o¢ cials
coordinate) the problem of uncoordinated corruption disappears. It is
important to note that the resulting lower graft payments benet both
economic actors and the bureaucracy. Notably, rapacious administra-
tions gain because the bribe revenues that can be extracted are higher
due to the absence of double marginalization. One might therefore ex-
pect that e¤orts are undertaken to reduce vertical competition between
government agencies.
Yet, De Soto (2000) presents striking evidence that in many develop-
ing countries quite the contrary is the case. Obtaining legal authorization
to build a house on public land in Peru requires the completion of 207
bureaucratic procedures involving 52 di¤erent government o¢ ces. Simi-
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lar endeavours in Egypt and the Philippines need approval of 31 agencies
in the former and 53 agencies in the latter case (and a multitude of ad-
ministrative steps). Analogous problems arise in obtaining the necessary
permits and licenses to open even a small business. De Sotos attempt to
legally operate a one-worker garment shop in Lima started a bureaucratic
process that took 289 days until completion. By that time he had paid
$1,231 in "fees" more than thirty times the monthly minimum wage
in Peru. It appears to be feasible to reduce this incredible obstacle to
development without excessive e¤ort if there is a political will to do so.
This chapter attempts to explain why there might be no such will even
though a coordination of competing agencies improves the welfare of both
society and rent extractors. The origin of the problem will be linked to
the fact that governments may only control part of the rent extraction
process. Section 2.2 formalizes Shleifer and Vishnys (1993) model of
independent bribery and derives their result of excessive corruption in
formal terms (Proposition 2.1). After observing some simple comparative
statics properties (Proposition 2.2), the main result of this chapter will
state that a coordination of government agents may be detrimental to
the bribe revenue the bureaucracy can extract (Proposition 2.3). It will
be noted that if government control is su¢ ciently low, it may even pay
to increase the number of independent bureaucracies (Proposition 2.4).
Section 2.3 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider an economy where entrepreneurs decide whether or not to start
an enterprise. There are I  2 bureaucratic agents (indexed by i) that
independently extract bribes bi  0, i = 1; :::; I, from rms. Each agent
represents a di¤erent government o¢ ce at which entrepreneurs have to
obtain a permit. Let b =
P
i bi denote the total level of bribes an en-
trepreneur has to pay when starting an enterprise. Given b, a mass of
N(b)  0 entrepreneurs will actually be active, where the function N()
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is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable. As bribes impede en-
trepreneurship, N 0(b) < 0. Moreover, it will be assumed that N 00(b)  0.
That is, the higher the bribe level, the more devastating the e¤ect on en-
trepreneurial activity both in absolute and in marginal terms. As bribes
are monetary transfers that reduce e¢ cient economic activity, welfare is
maximized when b = 0 and thus N = N(0).
Agents independently set their bribe demand bi to maximize bribe
revenue Ri = biN(b).1 Hence, the equilibrium bribes (b̂1; :::; b̂I) are char-
acterized by the I rst order conditions
N(b̂) + b̂iN
0(b̂) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; I (2.1)
where b̂ =
P
i b̂i. The associated second order conditions are
2N 0(b̂) + b̂iN
00(b̂) < 0 for all i = 1; :::; I. (2.2)
As b̂i =  N(b̂)=N 0(b̂) for all i by (2.1), the solution is symmetric. Sum-
ming (2.1) over all i gives
IN(b̂) + b̂N 0(b̂) = 0. (2.3)
Taking the derivative with respect to b̂ of this expression yields (I +
1)N 0(b̂) + b̂N 00(b̂) < 0. Thus, there exists at most one value b̂ > 0 that
fullls (2.3), so the solution is also unique.
The following proposition compares this non-cooperative equilibrium
with a situation where agents agree on an optimal common bribe level
b.
Proposition 2.1 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) Independent agents de-
mand higher total bribes per entrepreneur than coordinated agents.
1Following Shleifer and Vishny (1993) it will be assumed that agents do not risk
detection as higher ranked o¢ cials participate in the graft revenue.
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Proof. The coordinated solution b is characterized by
N(b) + bN 0(b) = 0. (2.4)
Suppose that b  b̂. Then we would have N(b̂)  N(b) and, by the
symmetry of equilibrium bribes, b̂i < b for all i = 1; :::; I. Using (2.1)
and (2.4) we must also have N 0(b̂) < N 0(b). By our assumptions on
N(), however, this would imply b̂ > b, a contradiction. 
According to Proposition 2.1, independent bribery induces a level
of corruption beyond the prot maximizing amount. As a result, both
public o¢ cials and entrepreneurs are worse o¤. Proposition 2.2 conveys
that this ine¢ ciency becomes worse the more independent agencies there
are.
Proposition 2.2 An increase in the number of independent agents has
the following e¤ects. (i) Total bribes per entrepreneur strictly increase.
(ii) Individual agentsbribe demands per entrepreneur strictly decrease.
(iii) Total welfare decreases. (iv) Individual agentsrevenues strictly de-
crease. (v) The total revenue from bribes decreases.
Proof. From (2.3)
db̂
dI
=   N(b̂)
(1 + I)N 0(b̂) + b̂N 00(b̂)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from (2.2) and the fact that I  2. This
proves (i). From (2.1) we have b̂i =  N(b̂)=N 0(b̂). Hence,
db̂i
dI
=  2N(b̂)db̂
dI
+
[N(b̂)]2N 00(b̂)
[N 0(b̂)]2
< 0 (2.5)
for all i = 1; :::; I. So (ii) is also correct. Furthermore, as b increases, N
must decrease, that is welfare goes down. This is part (iii). (iv) follows
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as both bi and N go down. Finally, (v) must be true because the total
revenue function bN(b) is globally concave in b and the equilibrium value
b̂ is di¤erent from the maximum value b. 
As the government controls all corrupt agents, it has a clear incentive
to prevent independent bribe extraction. A rapacious administration
would want di¤erent agencies to coordinate on an overall bribe level of
b to maximize graft income.
In many middle- and low-income countries, however, a substantial
amount of rent extraction involves agents who are not under the govern-
ments control. Criminal organizations like the Russian maa or Chinese
triads demand payments that represent a serious nancial obstacle to
private enterprise and foreign direct investment. Moreover, urban ar-
eas in developing countries often display soaring levels of street crime.
The situation in suburban zones (like Brazils favelas) and rural areas
(like the southern Philippines) may not be much more secure due to the
power of criminal factions. Furthermore, independent political groups
like Columbias guerrillas and paramilitary militias may possess signi-
cant power to extract rents. And even within the administration there
are often agencies the government for lack of political power can not
control.
Therefore, we will now consider a situation where in addition to the I
bureaucrats, there exists a set of A autonomous agents I+1; :::; J that are
not controlled by the government. Hence, there is a total amount of J =
I +A rent extractors. As a matter of notation, the J equilibrium bribes
resulting from independent corruption will be denoted as (b̂1; :::; b̂J) with
a total level of bribes b̂. As before, these can be inferred from (2.1),
with J replacing I. The solution where government agencies coordinate
will be denoted as (~b1; :::;~bJ) with ~b =
P
i
~bi. The following proposition
characterizes how a possible coordination of government agents a¤ects
the di¤erent groups and their behavior in this case.
Proposition 2.3 A coordination of government agents has the following
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e¤ects. (i) Total bribes per entrepreneur strictly decrease. (ii) Govern-
ment agentsbribe demands per entrepreneur strictly decrease. (iii) Au-
tonomous agentsbribe demands per entrepreneur strictly increase. (iv)
Total welfare increases. (v) Autonomous agentsrevenues increase. (vi)
Government agentsrevenues increase if and only if the government con-
trols a su¢ ciently large proportion of all agents. (vii) The total revenue
from bribes increases.
Proof. (i) follows directly from Proposition 2.2 (i) as a coordination
of I agents is equivalent to a situation where there are I  1 agents less.2
To prove (ii), we apply the implicit function theorem to (2.1) and derive
dbi
db i
=   N
0 + biN
00
2N 0 + biN 00
2 ( 1; 0), (2.6)
where b i =
P
j 6=i bj denotes the bribes of all agents except i. dbi=db i is
the slope of agent is reaction function to an exogenous change in bribes of
the other agents. Dening  i := dbi=db i, we therefore have dbi =  idb i.
Adding  idbi on both sides of this equation yields (1+ i)dbi =  idb which
is equivalent to dbi = [ i=(1 +  i)]db. Summing up this equation for all
agents except one (say, agent j) we obtain db j =
P
i6=j[ i=(1 +  i)]db.
Subtracting db on both sides gives  dbj =
hP
i6=j[ i=(1 +  i)]  1
i
db.
Rearranging we nd
db
dbj
=
1
1 
P
i6=j
 i
1+ i
2 (0; 1) (2.7)
for all j = 1; :::; J by (2.5). That is, if one agent or a group of agents
increase their bribe demand, the others will reduce their bribe demand
but by less, so the overall level of bribes rises. As a consequence, if the
coordinated government agents would increase their demand for bribes
2Mathematically, the reaction function of the A autonomous agents remain the
same. The I rst order conditions of the coordinated agents, however, are now all
given by N +
PI
i=1 biN
0(b) = 0. Dening b =
PI
i=1 bi, we thus have N +bN
0(b) = 0.
Hence, the coordinated agents act as if they were one combined agent.
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relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium (
PI
i=1
~bi 
PI
i=1 b̂i), the overall
level of bribes would also rise (~b  b̂). But this contradicts (i). Therefore,
(ii) must also hold. When (ii) holds, (iii) is implied by (2.6). Moreover,
by (i) we have N(~b) > N(b̂) which proves (iv). (v) follows from the
fact that both autonomous bribe demands ~b and the number of active
entrepreneurs N(~b) are increased. To prove (vi) we will rst consider the
case where only two of the I government agents coordinate. Denoting
by Ri(J) the uncoordinated bribe revenue from agent i when there are J
agents overall, total bribe revenue of government agents is IRi(J). After
coordination of two government agents, the revenue is (I   1)Ri(J  
1) as coordination is equivalent to one government agent disappearing.
Therefore, the resulting change in bribe revenue is  =  I[Ri(J)  
Ri(J   1)] Ri(J   1). Continuing to denote the total number of agents
as J , this is equivalent to
 =  I dRi(J   1)
dJ
 Ri(J   1). (2.8)
Using (2.1), an individual agents bribe revenue is
Ri(J) =  
[N(b(J))]2
N 0(b(J))
. (2.9)
From this we obtain
dRi
dJ
=  N db
dJ

2  N
00
(N 0)2

< 0. (2.10)
Plugging both (2.9) and (2.10) in (2.8) and rearranging we nd that
 = JN(b(J   1))db(J   1)
dJ

2  N
00(b(J   1))
[N 0(b(J   1))]2

| {z }
positive e¤ect
+
[N(b(J   1))]2
N 0(b(J   1))| {z }
negative e¤ect
(2.11)
where  = I=J denotes the proportion of government agents. Equation
(2.11) conveys the costs and benets of coordination: There is a positive
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e¤ect caused by higher bribes per agent and more entrepreneurial activity.
The negative e¤ect arises because, e¤ectively, one of the governments
agents disappears from the scene. Holding J constant we immediately
obtain d=d > 0. It has already been shown that  > 0 for  = 1.
Moreover, (2.11) conveys that lim!0 < 0. Therefore, d=d > 0
implies that there exists a threshold  2 (0; 1) such that coordination
between two government agents is detrimental if  <  but protable
if   . Since this is true for two government agents it will also be
true for an arbitrary number of government agents as a coordination of
I > 2 agents can be split in I   1 successive steps of coordination by the
participating agents. Finally, (vii) follows from the reduction of active
agents and Proposition 2.2 (v). 
The central result here is that a coordinated strategy can actually
harm the administration. This may appear counterintuitive at rst
glance: how can it be bad to act with combined forces? The follow-
ing heuristic argument describes the mechanism at work: Coordinated
government agents are aware that their bribe demand exerts a negative
externality on other government agents. Therefore, they ask for lower
bribes relative to the uncoordinated case. Autonomous agents, however,
exploit this fact by demanding higher bribes. As a nal result, gov-
ernment agents may be worse o¤ than without coordination.3 A simple
linear example illustrates that the existence of a single autonomous agent
may be su¢ cient to prevent coordination.
Example Consider a situation where N(b) =   b with  > 0 and
 > 0. Let I = 2 and A = 1, so there are two government agents and
one autonomous agent (the maa, say) that try to obtain bribes. Simple
algebra yields b̂1 = b̂2 = b̂3 = 14


implying b̂ = 3
4


and N(b̂) = 1
4
 in the
independent case. The revenue of the two government agents is therefore
3A helpful analogy might be that mergers in Cournot oligopoly which do not
involve all active rms possibly reduce the prot of the participating rms (Salant et
al., 1983).
Uncoordinated Corruption 42
1
8
2

. Coordination of agents 1 and 2 then results in a new equilibrium
where ~b1 = ~b2 = 16


< 1
4


(assuming that they have agreed to share their
proceeds evenly), while ~b3 = 13


> 1
4


. In this case ~b = 2
3


< 3
4


and
N(~b) = 1
3
 > 1
4
. The coordination has improved the situation both for
rent extractors in total and for entrepreneurs. The combined revenue of
government agents, however, is only 1
12
2

< 1
8
2

, so coordinating the two
agencies reduces the administrations revenue from bribes. 
This has very unfortunate consequences for societies with limited po-
litical control. Not only do rapacious administrations in such societies
have little incentive to alleviate the situation by coordinating public o¢ -
cials. Worse even, they may have an incentive to increase the number of
independent government bureaucrats articially to generate higher graft
revenues. That is, the very recklessness in bribery that causes uncoor-
dinated corruption to be so harmful to society in the rst place makes
it attractive to use in the ght for rent extraction against autonomous
agents. This will be recorded in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 If the government controls a su¢ ciently small propor-
tion of agents, it will be able to increase its revenue by creating new
government agencies that independently extract bribes.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 2.3 (vi) it immediately follows
that the positive e¤ect of establishing another agency is larger than the
negative e¤ect whenever I=J is su¢ ciently small. 
2.3 Discussion
When criminal organizations collect bribes from enterprises or when the
government has no e¤ective control over some public agencies, bureau-
cratic coordination may not be benecial for rent extraction anymore.
While it surely increases the revenue from bribery that corrupt agents
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in total can extract, it also shifts the distribution of revenue in favor of
outsiders. Due to low control, the government may even have an incen-
tive to articially expand the bureaucratic apparatus, aggravating the
problem of corruption although bribery is already beyond revenue max-
imizing levels. This explains oddities as the 207 procedures necessary to
legally purchase a small peace of land at the outskirts of Lima.
The result accords well with Mauros (1995) observation that bu-
reaucratic e¢ ciency and political stability are highly correlated. In po-
litically unstable societies, the governments control of public agencies is
often limited and organized crime is powerful.4 As a reaction, the ad-
ministration may expand its reach to enhance its share of rent extraction
vis-à-vis defecting agencies and criminal organizations. Therefore, the
model predicts that low political stability immediately implies bureau-
cratic ine¢ ciency of the sort discussed in the Introduction.
An implicit assumption of this chapter has been that there is no
agency problem between the government and the I bureaucrats that are
under its control, implying that superior public o¢ cials observe the bribes
obtained by their subordinates. Waller et al. (2002) show that if the gov-
ernment can identify payments only with a given probability, total bribes
per entrepreneur may increase as subordinates surcharge. Note, however,
that by changing the wage structure, graft money may be redirected to-
wards the central administration even if it has no way at all of observing
bribes paid to bureaucrats. For instance, if the government decides to
split a public agency because this increases bribe income for public o¢ -
cials, a correspondingly lower wage is su¢ cient to attract people to the
job. The revenue maximizing scheme for a rapacious government with
limited control is therefore to operate a large number of ine¢ ciently com-
peting agencies and to pay meagre salaries to its (corrupt) employees, an
infamous if frequently observed combination.
4Note that criminal organizations may blossom precisely because prosecutors are
corrupt and get paid to look away (see Kugler et al., 2005, for a model). This is how
countries like Nigeria and Kenya have simultaneously reached the bottom of crime
and corruption statistics.
Chapter 3
Optimal Incentive Contracts
in Political Agency Problems
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3.1 Introduction
There is a large and growing literature that shows how constitutional
mechanisms like elections and referenda provide incentives to alleviate
agency problems in politics.1 The problems that these mechanisms ad-
dress are, in principle, the same that incentive contracts for managers
are supposed to solve. Accordingly, the way they are analyzed in the
literature is very similar. For instance, a managerial agency model may
specify that a manager will be red if the prot of his unit is low (e.g.,
Radner, 1986), while optimal behavior in a voting model may involve that
a politician will not be re-elected if he was unsuccessful (e.g., Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 1997).2
But despite this theoretical congruence, real world incentive schemes
for politicians di¤er markedly from their counterparts for managers. In
particular, politicians are usually elected for a xed period of time. Con-
trary to many managers, they can therefore be dismissed only at certain
prespecied times but not before no matter how bad their interim per-
formance may have been.3 This means that although states of the world
may realize ex-post in which it is ine¢ cient to continue the principal-
agent relationship, the parties ex-ante commit themselves to hang on to
each other.
The origin of the problem is that a contract that stipulates the length
of the relationship beforehand can not react to occurrences that were not
contractible at the time the initial contract was written. A contract
that is less complete in the sense that it does not bind the parties to
continue their relationship if certain contractible contingencies are met
1Among many others, see Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997), Besley and Burgess (2002), Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Messner
and Polborn (2004). Surveys are provided by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley
(2006).
2See Banks and Sundaram (1998) for a general treatment.
3Notable exceptions are the recall-elections that are possible in several US states
including the State of California and the Canadian province of British Columbia. The
only country where the constitution currently allows a recall at the federal level is
Venezuela.
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can not only react to contractible but may also be able to react to non-
contractible variables if they are observable. For instance, if a principal
writes a two-period contract with an agent, the re-employment decision
after period one may only be made contingent on the output the agent
produces. If the contract leaves the re-employment decision open, how-
ever, the principal can also decide on the basis of non-contractible vari-
ables like whether the agent "gets along well with the rest of the team".
Such voluntary contractual incompleteness was rst highlighted by Bern-
heim and Whinston (1998) as a strategic asset. The question arises why
contracting parties would voluntarily write long-term contracts that do
not make use of the strategic possibilities that a less complete contract
would o¤er. Moreover, one would like to know why such arrangements
are made in the sphere of politics but much less often so in the business
world, where agents can often be dismissed instantaneously. This seems
particularly puzzling given that successful recall elections in California
have shown that a di¤erent system is practically feasible.
A potential explanation for the protection of politicians from recall
elections or other forms of instantaneous evaluation is the desire to induce
them to take decisions which are in the long-term interest of their vot-
ers, even if they involve short-term hardships. But, while there is some
truth to this, it can not be the whole story. If implementing the right
action involves that good outcomes will be more likely in the medium
term rather than the short term, then this only calls for patience of the
principal but not for self-restraint.4
In the political economy literature it is typically assumed from the
4A common response to this argument is that the typical voter does not under-
stand that farsighted politics may involve short-term hardships (which the holder
of such an opinion of course does) and that the constitution must therefore protect
the naïve citizen from his unreected impatience. There are two reasons why this is
not particularly appealing. First, it suggests to leave the ground of rational decision
making, something that economists have been reluctant to do, and with good reason.
Second, it stands in blatant contrast to the whole purpose of giving the people elec-
toral power in the rst place. If the public was so fundamentally myopic, why let it
vote at all?
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outset that voters can not recall political agents during a term. In many
models, this exogenous restriction is clearly not optimal. A point in
case is the seminal agency model developed by Barro (1973), Ferejohn
(1986) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). All incentive problems
that arise in the model ultimately stem from the restriction that political
agents are untouchable during the length of a term. If the electorate were
to change the constitution such that instantaneous dismissal of the ruling
politician can take place whenever a majority of voters calls for it in a
referendum, one would be able to achieve the rst best. In that sense the
presence of electoral terms is indeed at the heart of the political agency
problem.
This chapter describes the precise circumstances under which com-
mitment to long-term relationships in agency problems is ex-ante e¢ cient
even though ex-post e¢ ciency would call for a termination of the rela-
tionship in some states of the world. In order to do so, a principal-agent
model is set up that is su¢ ciently general to encompass political and man-
agerial agency as important special cases. It turns out that commitment
to long-term contracts may be optimal if and only if the contractibility
of outcomes is su¢ ciently low. It will be argued that low contractibility
is precisely what distinguishes political agency problems from manager-
ial agency problems, thereby explaining why commitment to long-term
labor contracts is common in politics but less so in private enterprises.
The chapter goes on to show that the ine¢ ciency that possibly arises
from committing to long-term contracts may be outweighed by the fact
that such commitment induces more e¢ cient investments, highlighting a
trade-o¤ that the electorate faces in political agency between inducing
e¢ cient political decisions and ousting unsuccessful candidates.
The fact that the model links commitment to long-term contracts
with limited contractibility is encouraging because the latter can also
explain a second particularity of political agency, namely the absence
of monetary incentive schemes. As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have
shown, giving explicit incentives on contractible tasks may re back when
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other tasks are not contractible since the agent may shift too much at-
tention to the things he gets paid for. Therefore, low contractibility of
political outcomes can explain both distinguishing features of political
agency mechanisms: the unconditionality of long-term contracts and the
absence of incentive pay.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 rst discusses the re-
lated literature. Section 3.3 then presents a simple model of the principal-
agent relationship. Section 3.4 continues to show which allocations are
implementable, characterizes appropriate contracts that implement them
and analyzes which contracts are chosen under which circumstances. Sec-
tion 3.5 discusses possible extensions and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The contract theory literature, including Farrell and Shapiro (1989),
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Guriev and Kvossov (2006) and Ellman
(2006), has stressed the benets of long-term contracts in mitigating the
hold-up problem. At the heart of these models, however, is the ex-post
expropriation of the benets of ex-ante relationship-specic investments,
a minor concern in the sphere of politics. In another direction, Aghion
and Bolton (1987) show how the contract duration can be used by a
monopolist to deter entry into its industry.
Turning to the political economy literature, Akemann and Kanczuk
(2000) argue, as this chapter does, that prolonging electoral terms in-
creases politiciansincentives to reect the long term benets of a deci-
sion. However, they consider only constitutional mechanisms which are
arbitrary in the sense that they do not belong the set of optimal mech-
anisms in their paper. By contrast, this chapter endogenously derives
an optimal contract from rst principles, which turns out to have the
structure of a political term (the premise of Akemann and Kanczuks
analysis) only under very specic conditions. This approach allows to
derive a number of features of the political agency problem endogenously
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and to clarify when political terms are optimal and when they are not
(which is the case when potential candidates are su¢ ciently heteroge-
neous, when myopic policies are relatively harmless, when contractibility
is high or when there is symmetric information on candidatesoutside
options).
Gersbach (2000, 2004) proposes to give politicians monetary incen-
tives in order to take long term outcomes into account. However, there
are good reasons why monetary incentive schemes for politicians are not
observed in reality. As will be argued below, many if not most political
outcomes are not contractible anyway, so contingent payments can not be
made. Moreover, for those outcomes which are contractible, multitask-
ing problems are likely to destroy the potential benets that incentive
contracts may have. This problem is particularly severe if some political
outcomes are not observable to the public. This chapter therefore seeks
for an optimal incentive mechanism given that contractibility is limited.
3.3 The Model
Consider a principal who wants to hire an agent in order to perform some
task for him. For instance, the principal could be the owner and the agent
the manager of a rm. Alternatively, the principal could be an electorate
that appoints a politician as an agent.5 Agents are drawn from a large
population and can be either of two types  2 fb; gg, where g denotes
a good type and b a bad type. The probability of drawing either type is
identical. It is assumed that ex-ante, neither the principal nor potential
agents know the agentstypes as it is unclear how they are suited to the
specic task.
The game lasts two periods t = 1; 2, where second period outcomes
are discounted with a common discount factor , which is normalized to
5As is common in the literature on political agency, it is assumed that there is no
conict of interest between voters so the common agency problem e¤ectively becomes
a standard one-principal-problem.
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one. In each period t, the agent is supposed to generate some unspecied
outcome Xt (e.g., prot or political success). The outcome consists of
a contractible component xt 2 f0; xg and a non-contractible component
x̂t 2 f0; xg, where x > 0. The overall outcome Xt = xt + (1  )x̂t is a
weighted average of the two components, so  2 (0; 1) describes the im-
portance of the contractible relative to the non-contractible component.
Our interpretation of the model will be that low contractibility (small
) describes a problem of political agency while high contractibility (large
) describes a managerial agency problem. The reason for this interpre-
tation is that managers are typically expected to maximize prot an
outcome that is easily included into a contract and veried by a court.
Politicians, on the other hand, usually have much more complex job de-
scriptions: besides stimulating the creation of wealth they are supposed
to guarantee "just" redistribution, to provide an "e¢ cient" amount of
public goods and to pursue a foreign policy that is "in the interest of
the country". Many of these objectives are di¢ cult to describe ex-ante
even though ex-post voters recognize a good policy when they see one.
Hence, the contractibility of political outcomes is limited even though
observability is not.
For both components of Xt, the probability of reaching a good out-
come is given by pg 2 (0; 1) for the good type and pb 2 (0; pg) for the
bad type, that is Pr(xt = x j  = g) = Pr(x̂t = x j  = g) = pg and
Pr(xt = x j  = b) = Pr(x̂t = x j  = b) = pb < pg for t = 1; 2. After
the rst period, both principal and agent observe both outcomes and can
use them to make inferences on the agents type. If both outcomes are
good, the belief on the agents type improves as
Pr ( = g j x1 = x ^ x̂1 = x) =
p2g
p2g + p
2
b
>
1
2
(3.1)
by Bayesrule. If both outcomes are bad, on the other hand, the belief
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deteriorates as
Pr( = g j x1 = 0 ^ x̂1 = 0) =
(1  pg)2
(1  pg)2 + (1  pb)2
<
1
2
. (3.2)
How mixed signals are interpreted depends on the parameter values.
Pr( = g j x1 = x ^ x̂1 = 0) = Pr ( = g j x1 = 0 ^ x̂1 = x) (3.3)
=
pg(1  pg)
pg(1  pg) + pb(1  pb)
>
1
2
if and only if pg + pb < 1.
For simplicity, it will be assumed that pg + pb < 1 in what follows (this
is an inessential assumption). Therefore, the principal wants to keep the
agent in period two if at least one outcome was positive. Otherwise, the
principal wants to dismiss the agent. If that happens a new agent is
drawn from the pool for period two.
Both in the political and in the managerial context, agents routinely
have to take investment decisions that determine the emphasis that is
placed on current performance relative to future performance. For in-
stance, a politician may be tempted to postpone urgent labor market
reforms because he expects them to lead to hardships in the short run.
Similarly, a manager may be tempted to forgo appropriate R&D invest-
ments to boost current prots. To capture this investment problem in
the model, the agent will be allowed to shift probability mass between
the two time periods. Formally, the agent can choose at the beginning
of period one to decrease Pr(x2 = x) by q 2 (0; pb) percentage points,
which in turn increases Pr(x1 = x) by q0 2 (0; q) percentage points (and
likewise for shifts from x1 to x2, ~x2 to ~x1 and ~x1 to ~x2). The fact that
q0 < q reects that such probability shifts are ine¢ cient and will not
occur in the rst best.
If the agent has shifted probability mass, the inference on the agents
type that can be drawn from the rst period outcomes changes, so equa-
tions (3.1) to (3.3) have to be adjusted with the new probabilities of
reaching a given outcome. To avoid having to go through a number of
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case distinctions (and with no qualitative consequences to the results) we
will continue to assume that the probability that an agent is of a good
type is larger than 1=2 whenever at least one outcome was good. More
formally, it will be assumed that (pg + q0) + (pb + q0) < 1.
To make things interesting, it is assumed that the agents investment
choice is not observable by the principal. In order to induce e¢ cient
investments and to sort agents, the principal therefore designs an appro-
priate contract which he o¤ers potential agents who can accept or reject
it. A contract contains the wage that is paid (possibly depending on
performance and whether or not the agent is dismissed after period one)
and may contain a re-employment decision that species under which
circumstances the contract will be extended to period two. Specically,
a contract is a tuple (w1; w2; d), where w1 : (x1; d)! R denotes the rst
period wage, w2 : (x1; x2; d) ! R [ ? denotes the second period wage
and d : x1 ! f0; 1g [ ? denotes the re-employment decision.6 d = 1
represents the case where the agent is employed for two periods, while
d = 0 corresponds to the case where the agent is dismissed after period
one.
It will be assumed that the principal is able to commit to employ the
agent for two periods so that there will be no renegotiation of the contract
duration when dismissal becomes attractive ex-post but was excluded ex-
ante.7 Because x̂1 is not contractible, the rst period wage can only be
made contingent on outcome x1. Likewise, if the second period wage is
6Note that both wages map into the set of real numbers. That is, negative wage
payments are in principle allowed. This assumption is made for simplicity only. The
central equilibrium contract of this paper that is presented in Proposition 2.2 involves
strictly positive wage payments in all states of the world. The other contracts could
be easily adapted along the lines of Innes (1990).
7This could either be due to the fact that the principal has been able to build up a
reputation of sticking to contracts with his agents. Or it could be that the principal is
able to undertake measures that de facto commit the parties to stick to the contract.
For instance, the job design could be made specic to the agent so that a later change
of employment would induce substantial transaction costs. In the case of political
agency, the commitment assumption seems particularly innocuous as constitutions
are di¢ cult to renege upon.
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already written into the contract, it can only depend on the contractible
outcomes x1 and x2. As a re-employment decision can (but must not) be
included into the contract, the parties have the opportunity to regulate
the contract duration exibly. If the re-employment decision is left open
in the original contract, the parties will have to come to a new agreement
after period one. Negotiating the prolongation of the contract at that
point has the advantage that the principal can make his o¤er contingent
on the observed outcome of both output dimensions, that is, we then
have d : (x1; x̂1)! f0; 1g. Note that both wages can in principle depend
on the re-employment decision.
Of course, the agent will only accept a contract o¤er by the principal
if it is better than his outside option. Agents have an outside oppor-
tunity which guarantees them a utility of u1 in period one. If an agent
was employed by the principal in the rst period, his second period out-
side option u2(x1; x̂1) depends on his rst period performance, which is
publicly observable by assumption and acts as a signal about the agents
type. Therefore, u2(x1; x̂1) strictly increases in both arguments.8 It will
be assumed that the good outcome x is large relative to the agents out-
side option. This assumption is merely for the sake of exposition and
does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of the results.
Both principal and agent are assumed to be risk-neutral. Therefore,
the agent receives utility U = w1 + w2 (where w2 is given by the agents
outside option whenever he is red after period one). The principals
utility V = X1   w1 +X2   w2 is given by the summation of outcomes
minus wage payments.
8In order to be precise, the second period outside option if set optimally by
alternative employers also depends on the other parameter values of the model (e.g.,
pg and pb). Because depending on those, the principal designs the contract which
inuences the agents investment behavior and hence the quality of the signals x1 and
x̂1. However, for our purposes it is su¢ cient to acknowledge that being successful in
period one increases the agents outside option in period two. Spelling out the precise
magnitude by which the outside option changes is not relevant.
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3.4 Implementation
When designing the contract he o¤ers, the principal has three things
in mind. He wants to address the sorting problem, he wants the agent
to undertake e¢ cient investments in both dimensions, and he wants to
pay as little as necessary. With full information, therefore, the rst best
contract would specify that the agent is reemployed if and only if at
least one outcome turns out to be good, that the agent may not shift
probability mass from one period to another and that wages are such
that the agent receives his outside option in each period.
We will now see the surprising result that this rst best outcome is
unconditionally attainable even under asymmetric information. With a
slight abuse of terminology, the sequence of contracts that achieves this
will be denoted as a Golden Handshake Contract.9
Proposition 3.1 (Golden Handshake Contract) There exists a sequence
of short term contracts that implements the rst best. These contracts
have the following characteristics. (i) The re-employment decision is left
open in the rst contract and the principal dismisses the agent if and only
if both outcomes are bad. (ii) The agents rst period wage is not made
contingent on outcomes but is larger if the agent is dismissed afterwards.
In the second period the agent receives incentive pay.
Proof. We will rst specify further characteristics of the optimal
sequence of contracts. The second period wage the principal is willing to
pay will of course depend on the rst period outcomes. If both outcomes
were bad, the newly drawn agent will be o¤ered a xed wage of his
outside option u1 which will be accepted. If at least one outcome was
good, the old agent will be o¤ered a new contract that depends on the
rst period outcome in the contractible task. If x1 = x, the proposed
9Here, and in what follows, it is assumed that the agent chooses the action that is
most benecial for the principal whenever his own payo¤ is una¤ected by the choice
of action.
Optimal Incentive Contracts 55
second period wage is large if x2 = x and small if x2 = 0. If, on the
other hand, x1 = 0, the proposed second period wage is small if x2 = x
and large if x2 = 0. In all cases, the expected value of w2 is chosen
such that it exactly matches the agents outside option after rst period
outcomes have been revealed (taking the inferred values of (3.1) to (3.3)
as the probabilities of contracting with a good type). What remains to be
specied is the rst period wage. In expectation, w1 is chosen such that
it exactly matches the agents outside option u1. The rst period wage
with dismissal is chosen to be larger than the rst period wage without
dismissal by an amount that exactly matches the expected benet of
attaining x̂1 = x instead of x̂1 = 0 (which arises before knowing the
realization of x1 due to the higher expected salary in period two).
After characterizing the sequence of contracts, it will now be shown
that they indeed implement the rst best. First observe that in both
periods the agents outside option is paid in expectation so that the ex-
pected wage payment is indeed the lowest o¤er that is still acceptable for
the agent. Further, the sorting problem is addressed in the most e¢ cient
way by dismissing agents whenever the updated probability of contract-
ing with a good type falls below one half. Finally, it has to be checked
that in both the contractible and non-contractible dimension, the agent
has no incentive to shift probability mass in either direction. Let us rst
consider probability shifts in the contractible dimension. Is there an in-
centive to increase the probability of achieving x1 = x at the expense
of reducing the probability of x2 = x? The simplest way of recognizing
that this is not the case is by noting that the higher probability of being
successful at x1 creates expectations for period two that the agent will
(on average) not be able to fulll. If indeed the agent achieves x1 = x,
the principal will infer from this that the probability of being confronted
with a good agent is given by (3.1) or (3.3), depending on the result in the
non-contractible dimension. From this he induces a probability of reach-
ing good outcomes in period two, which is used in setting the expected
wage level w2. The actual probability (after shifting probability mass
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downwards), however, is lower for two reasons. First, the agents good
results in the rst period were positively inuenced by the probability
shift and so do not reect in the same way that the agent is actually of a
good type. Second, the probability shift reduces the second period prob-
ability of being successful. Therefore, increasing the second period wage
spread (with a low payment for x2 = 0 and a high payment for x2 = x)
can make the agents expected second period wage arbitrarily small, ren-
dering downward probability shifts useless if the agent stays with the
principal.10 A similar argument applies for upward shifts of probability
mass that increase the probability of achieving x2 = x while reducing
the probability of x2 = 0. In this case, the principal infers a success
probability for the second period which is lower than the actual prob-
ability. Therefore, paying a su¢ ciently low wage for x2 = x will make
such a shift unattractive. Finally, note that by construction, probability
shifts in the non-contractible dimension can never strictly increase the
agents expected income. In fact, the golden handshake he receives after
being dismissed exactly compensates him for the losses that result from
not having x̂1 = 0, so the agent is indi¤erent whether the probability of
reaching x̂1 = x changes. As he is also indi¤erent about the outcome
of x̂2 because w2 can not be made contingent on x̂2, shifting probability
mass in the non-contractible dimension can never strictly increase the
agents expected payo¤. 
Golden handshake contracts have very natural features. The princi-
pal uses incentive pay to stop the agent from shifting probability mass
in the contractible dimension. Trying to fool the principal by favoring
short-term success over long-term perspectives is not advisable because
10In principle, the agent could nevertheless want to make the probability shift,
planning to decline the principals second period o¤er and making use of the better
outside option that success brings about. Note, however, that declining the principals
o¤er is a signal that a probability shift was done and hence the agents outside o¤er
will be revised using the probability of being a good type that are inferred when
taking into account that probability was shifted. If this is done, the agent can never
gain from this move relative to what he could also achieve by not shifting probability
mass.
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the principal can make the agents short-term performance the measure
for long-term pay: as future failures are punished hard after present
successes, probability shifting in that dimension is not a worry for the
principal.11 The non-contractible task should be expected to be more of
a problem because direct incentive pay can not be used. Here, however,
the principal employs the golden handshake. By compensating the agent
for a bad outcome at x̂1 whenever this leads to dismissal, the agent can
be prevented from trying to shine in period one at the expense of period
two.
Similar payments, usually called golden parachutes, are frequently
made after takeovers to the incumbent top management when it loses its
job due to the change of ownership. Often, these payments are explicitly
written into the original employment contracts. Arguments for golden
parachutes that have been brought forward are that they constitute de-
ferred payments which would be lost after a takeover (Knoeber, 1986)
and that they may be part of an optimal incentive scheme that increases
relationship-specic investments of managers (Schnitzer, 1995).12 To this
literature this chapter adds the benet that golden parachutes may be
an e¢ cient way to prevent agents from focusing on short-term success at
the expense of long-term protability.13
Note that the prospect of a golden handshake makes it necessary to
decrease the rst period wage of successful agents below their rst period
outside option in order to maintain E[w1] = u1. This means that the pay-
ment schedule increases even more strongly over time than information
revelation on a successful agents ability would justify anyhow. Again,
this is reminiscent of deferred compensation theories which suggest that
11This discussion of Proposition 3.1 only highlights the problem of shifting prob-
ability mass from the second to the rst period, but similar arguments can be made
in the other direction.
12For a critical view see Bebchuk and Fried (2003).
13Gersbach (2004) also proposes golden parachute clauses in the context of political
agency. However, in his model golden parachutes fulll the purpose of protecting the
agent from ex-post expropriation of deferred payments, which corresponds to the
motivation the literature on takeovers provides.
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initial salaries are low compared to productivity, but then increase dis-
proportionately, a phenomenon that can be observed in many industries
(see Prendergast, 1999, for an overview of this literature). Note, how-
ever, that in our model, low rst period wages for successful agents do
not arise because payments are deferred to the future as agents in expec-
tation receive no more than their outside option as a second period wage.
Rather, low rst period wages to successful agents are the counterpart
to the golden handshake payments that must be made to agents that are
dismissed after bad results.
Contracts in this model are essentially short-term in nature: there is
no need to hold on to agents if they turn out to be unsuccessful. While
one may feel happy for the principal, the question remains open why
one would give politicians unconditional long-term contracts. As the
exercise has shown, the danger that politicians may act myopically as
such is not su¢ cient to warrant any restrictions even in the presence
of a sorting problem. The question then is what ingredients a model
would need to generate results that match with the real world prevalence
of political terms at least if one contains that one of the constitutional
cornerstones of liberal democracies which has emerged over the centuries
is not an ine¢ cient artefact.
Maybe the most obvious way to argue that the Golden Handshake
Contract from Proposition 3.1 is an implausible rst best solution is to
criticize that it potentially contains punishments for good results and
rewards for bad results. And indeed if one would introduce a standard
moral hazard component into the model this would bring about low e¤ort
provision by the agent in period two in some states of the world. This
does not change anything in the way of making long term commitments
more attractive, however, and a discussion of moral hazard will therefore
be postponed to Section 3.5.
The critical feature of the model turns out to be the agents out-
side option, which we have assumed to be known not only by the agent
but also by the principal. Yet, in reality a principal will never be fully
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aware of the idiosyncratic value an agent attaches to a particular job and
other alternatives he may have. Thus, a desirable property of a derived
mechanism would certainly be that it is immune at least against small
perturbations of the agents outside options. Alas, the Golden Hand-
shake Contract of Proposition 3.1 is not robust at all towards such an
innocent alteration of the model.
Before proving this in Lemma 1, we will rst dene the way uncer-
tainty enters. Assume that each outside option ui() is now given by
ui() = u + ', where u represents the original value of ui() and ' is
drawn from a probability distribution with atomless probability density
function f(') on the support [ ; ] and with expected value zero. In
what follows, if  is innitesimally small, we will speak of an "arbitrarily
small degree of uncertainty". Naturally, it will be assumed that the agent
is aware of the precise value of his outside options while the principal only
knows their distribution.
Lemma 1 With an arbitrarily small degree of uncertainty on the size
of the agents outside options, there exists no contractual structure that
implements the rst best.
Proof. Suppose there exists a sequence of contracts that implements
the rst best. Then the reemployment decision must be d = 0 if and
only if x1 = 0 and x̂1 = 0. Assume rst that the principal does not
make w1 contingent on d. As the agents outside option for period 2
must be fullled and since u2(x1; x̂1) is strictly increasing in x̂1, we must
then have w2(x1; x̂1 = 1)  u2(x1; x̂1 = 1) > u2(x1; x̂1 = 0). As w2
can not be made contingent on x̂2 the latter implies that the agent has
an incentive to shift probability mass from x̂2 to x̂1: x̂2 does not a¤ect
the agents payo¤, while a higher probability of achieving good results in
period one increases both the probability of being hired for period two
and the expected future wage. Hence, we have a contradiction.
To complete the proof, note that making w1 contingent on d does not
help to improve the situation. While in the environment of Proposition
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3.1 the principal could increase the spread between w1(d = 0) and w1(d =
1) up to the point where the agent is indi¤erent about the outcome of
x̂1, this is not possible here as the probability of guessing the outside
option exactly right is zero as f has a probability mass of zero on each
possible realization. As the agents outside option bears a slight amount
of uncertainty, the agent would hence either prefer to shift probability
mass to x̂2 or to x̂1. 
The reason why already a small degree of asymmetric information
concerning the agents outside option destroys the feasibility of the
Golden Handshake Contract is that its central component to implement
e¢ cient investments in the non-contractible task is a payment that makes
the agent indi¤erent about the outcome of x̂1. But since the utility the
agent expects under di¤erent circumstances depends on his outside op-
tions (which are stochastic from the point of view of the principal) the
chance of paying an amount that achieves exact indi¤erence has zero
probability. As the proof of Lemma 1 shows, the principal has no hope
of e¢ ciently sorting agents and implementing the optimal long-term in-
vestment in the non-contractible dimension at the same time. As a con-
sequence he must decide which of the two is more important to him.
Proposition 2 presents a contract that induces the agent not to shift
probability mass between periods in both dimensions (at the expense of
achieving e¢ cient sorting).
Proposition 3.2 (Commitment Contract) There exists a long term con-
tract that prevents the agent from shifting probability mass in both tasks
and in expectation pays no more than the agents expected outside op-
tion. This contract has the following characteristics. (i) The principal
commits not to dismiss the agent. (ii) The agent receives a at wage in
both periods.
Proof. Consider the following two period contract. The rst period
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wage is w1 = u1,14 the second period wage is w2 = E[u2(x1; x̂1) j Pr( =
g) = 1=2], where the expectation is taken under the assumption that the
agent does not shift probability mass. By construction, the principals
expected payment is equal to the agents expected outside option. As the
agents wage is una¤ected by performance, he has no incentive to shift
probability mass. 
In a next step, we have to show which contractual structure e¢ ciently
implements correct sorting (while foregoing e¢ cient investments in the
non-contractible task). This is done by Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 (Incentive Contract) There exists a series of short
term contracts that e¢ ciently sorts agents, induces e¢ cient investments
in the contractible task and in expectation pays no more than the agents
expected outside option. These contracts have the following characteris-
tics. (i) The re-employment decision is left open in the rst contract and
the principal dismisses the agent if and only if both outcomes are bad.
(ii) The agent receives a at wage in period one, but incentive pay in
period two.
Proof. Consider the following two-period contract. The agent is dis-
missed if and only if both outcomes are bad. The rst period wage is
w1 = u1, the second period wage is exactly as in the Golden Handshake
Contract: In case x1 = x, w2 is high if x2 = x and low if x2 = 0, in
expectation paying the agents outside option. In case x1 = 0, w2 is low
if x2 = x and high if x2 = 0, again paying the agents outside option in
expectation. Obviously, sorting is handled e¢ ciently. By construction,
the agent also receives no more than his outside option. With the same
logic as in Proposition 3.1, the agent does not have an incentive to shift
probability mass from or to x2. 
14More precisely, the principal must set w1 = u1 +  to be sure to match the
agents outside option. But as  is innitesimally small by assumption, we refrain
from explicitly noting it here (and likewise in what follows).
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Both the Commitment Contract and the Incentive Contract have very
natural analogons in the real world. The Commitment Contract very
much looks like the form of contract that is dominant in many public
sector positions, involving maximal job security and at incentives. The
Incentive Contract on the other hand resembles the contractual norm
in many private sector employments. Dismissal is easy (and will take
place after bad performance) and monetary incentives are used to induce
the agent to act in the interest of the principal. Proposition 3.4 now
compares the two contracts and shows under which circumstances which
contractual structure will be chosen.
Proposition 3.4 With an arbitrarily small degree of uncertainty on the
size of the agents outside options, the principal will either o¤er an In-
centive Contract (if the degree of contractibility is su¢ ciently large or if
the sorting problem is su¢ ciently important relative to the investment
problem) or a Commitment Contract (if the degree of contractibility is
su¢ ciently small and if the investment problem is su¢ ciently important
relative to the sorting problem).
Proof. Taking into account that the wage payments are small relative
to x as they correspond to the agents respective outside option, o¤ering
the Commitment Contract gives the principal an expected utility of
VCC = (pg + pb)x (3.4)
since the agent reaches the good outcome with a probability of (pg +
pb)=2 at all instances. If the principal o¤ers the Incentive Contract, his
expected payo¤ can be shown to be
VIC =
pg + pb
2
x+ (1  )(q0   q)x+ 1
2
pg + pb
2
x (3.5)
+
1
2
(1  pb   q0)(1  pb)pg + (1  pg   q0)(1  pg)pb
(1  pb   q0)(1  pb) + (1  pg   q0)(1  pg)
x.
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Comparing (3.4) and (3.5) one nds that VCC  VIC if and only if
1
2
pg + pb
2
x  (1  )(q0   q)x (3.6)
+
1
2
(1  pb   q0)(1  pb)pg + (1  pg   q0)(1  pg)pb
(1  pb   q0)(1  pb) + (1  pg   q0)(1  pg)
x.
This inequality is more likely to hold, the smaller q0   q (i.e., the larger
the investment problem), the smaller pg pb (i.e., the smaller the sorting
problem) and the smaller  (i.e., the lower contractibility). If  ! 1,
(3.6) can not hold and if  ! 0 and pg ! pb, it always holds. This
establishes the proposition. 
Proposition 3.4 shows that it may be optimal for a principal to com-
mit to a long-term contract whenever contractibility is low. In such a
situation, giving explicit incentives to implement e¢ cient investments is
not feasible and hence the principal has to redress to other means of pre-
venting shifts in probability mass. He would certainly like to make the
agent believe that he will be patient with him, in order not to push him
to focus too much on short-term successes. But the agent knows well
enough that this would not be in the interest of the principal ex-post
as bad results will also be interpreted as a sign that the agent is of low
ability. Hence, the principal must actually commit not to dismiss the
agent. This of course has the disadvantage that e¢ cient sorting does not
take place and so the principal will choose the Commitment Contract
only if the investment problem is su¢ ciently pronounced compared to
the sorting problem, even if contractibility is low.
When contractibility is high, the Commitment Contract does not do
much good. In this case the damage that can be done by shifting prob-
ability mass in the non-contractible dimension is low, as this task is of
minor relevance to the principal, so the Incentive Contract is more attrac-
tive. Indeed, if contractibility goes to one, the downside of the Incentive
Contract (ine¢ cient investments in the non-contractible dimension) dis-
appears completely, as is recorded in Corollary 1. This is the result
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that one would expect under complete contractibility with a risk-neutral
agent.
Corollary 1 If contractibility is high ( ! 1), an Incentive Contract
can approximate the rst best.
One feature of optimal contracts for politicians that all potentially
optimal contracts share is that pay increases over time if the politician
is successful. While this seems to be at odds with the typical bureau-
cratic salary regulation which provides no explicit pay raises after re-
election, I would still argue that this is something that can be observed
in reality. First, success in the form of good economic conditions puts
the government in a better position when it bargains over salaries for
politicians. This argument has been empirically veried by Di Tella and
Fisman (2004) who show that gubernatorial wages in US states are heav-
ily inuenced by past successes and failures of the respective governors,
suggesting an implicit pay for performance scheme. Second, successful
politicians can count on signicant non-wage increases in pay, deriving
from later consulting activity, media presence and follow-up jobs.
3.5 Extensions
In this section we will consider two possible extensions of the basic model
that was explored in the previous section. First it seems worthwhile to
investigate how e¤ort provision in the sense of the canonical moral hazard
model would a¤ect the optimal contract choice. As noted earlier, moral
hazard obstructs the provision of incentives for e¢ cient investment de-
cisions of the agent, as explicit incentives in some instances require that
the agent be punished after good results in period two. Maybe not sur-
prisingly, this may invalidate the conclusion from Corollary 1 that the
rst best can be approximated when contractibility goes to one. More
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importantly, however, moral hazard acts as an additional constraint on
the use of the Commitment Contract. As the Commitment Contract is
characterized by xed payments and unconditional employment, incen-
tives to shirk are maximal. Therefore, adding moral hazard to the model
reinforces the downside of committing to long-term contracts in much the
same way as a more pronounced heterogeneity of agents (i.e., a bigger
sorting problem) does.
Given that there are two tasks, a further natural extension of the
model is to incorporate multitasking problems. If the agent can shift
probability mass from one task to another, this has di¤erent e¤ects on
the two optimal contracts. For the commitment contract obviously noth-
ing changes. As wage payments do not respond to outcomes, there would
be no reason for the agent to engage in multitasking. Things are di¤er-
ent for the Incentive Contract. As second period outcomes in the non-
contractible dimension can not be incentivized, there will be a tempta-
tion to shift attention to or away from the contractible second period task
whenever its outcome generates a wage spread. As a result, there is an
antagonism between preventing multitasking (which calls for at wages)
and preventing ine¢ cient investment decisions (which calls for incentive
pay).
Note that multitasking is particularly harmful when contractibility is
low. In that case, focusing on the (relatively unimportant) contractible
task to the detriment of the (relatively important) non-contractible task
can do most damage (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). As a conse-
quence, the principal will never want to use an Incentive Contract when
 is low, even if sorting is very important, which also makes the Commit-
ment Contract unattractive. In that case the optimal contract, which we
will denote as the No Commitment Contract has the following character-
istics. First, a sequence of short-term contracts will be chosen which leave
the reemployment decision open to tackle the sorting problem (which we
have assumed to be substantial). Second, there will be a at wage cor-
responding to the size of the agents outside option in both periods to
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avoid multitasking.
Choosing between the Commitment Contract and the No Commit-
ment Contract in case of low contractibility brings about nicely the gen-
eral features of payments for politicians. As in reality, neither contract
involves contingent payments. And there is a trade-o¤ the designer of
a constitution faces when he makes his choice: if the sorting problem is
relatively big, one should opt for short political terms (represented by
the No Commitment Contract). If, on the other hand, the provision of
long-term investment incentives is relatively more important, political
terms should be long (represented by the Commitment Contract).
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter answers three questions concerning the use of electoral
terms, which are unconditional long-term contracts, in politics. (1) What
use can it have to commit to a long-term contract even if it may later
turn out that breaking up the principal-agent relationship would be ef-
cient? (2) Why is this commitment observed to provide incentives for
politicians but less so to provide incentives for managers? (3) Given that
commitment may be optimal, what factors inuence the optimal length
of a political term?
It has been shown that commitment to long-term contracts may
be useful to curb opportunistic behavior of politicians, preventing that
short-term results are overemphasized at the detriment of sustainable
achievements. In doing so, an imperfect instrument (unconditional reem-
ployment) is used because political outcomes are typically of low con-
tractibility, while explicit incentives can be used to induce e¢ cient in-
vestments when contractibility is high (as in many managerial constella-
tions). Given that there are political terms, there is a trade-o¤ between
inducing e¢ cient investments (which calls for long terms) and the desire
to oust incompetent politicians (which calls for short terms).
These results will allow researchers that analyze policy formation in
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di¤erent elds of political economy to restrict attention to a particularly
simple class of mechanisms when they incorporate agency problems into
their models: the class of simple reelection schemes that do without
contingent payments.
Chapter 4
Solvency Regulation in
Insurance Markets with
Rational Consumers
This chapter is based on joint work with Ray Rees.
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4.1 Introduction
Virtually all developed insurance markets are subject to intense regula-
tion by government authorities. One of the main focuses of supervision
is the solvency of insurance rms. Currently, the European Union is
working on Solvency II, a new capital adequacy framework for European
insurance companies. Solvency II is supposed to do for the insurance
industry what Basel II has done for banking, namely a change towards a
regulation that takes specic rm characteristics into account. Although
negotiations are still underway, it seems to be clear that the new rules
will increase the requirements from insurance rms both in terms of the
provision of capital and information.2 At a global level, the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors seeks to harmonize national regu-
lations by proposing core principles of insurance regulation. Given the
pervasiveness of solvency regulations, it is natural to ask what benets
they may bring about and how an optimal regulatory policy should look
like.
In the Property and Casualty sector, policyholders hand over a pre-
mium to insurers in order to receive a reimbursement in case specied
losses occur in the future. Insurers of course will only be able to meet
their obligation if they have su¢ cient reserves to cover the claims of their
clients. A widespread view holds that solvency regulation e.g., the im-
position of minimum reserve levels then has the task to ensure that
insurance companies do not evade their contractual obligations by failing
to put up appropriate levels of reserves. According to this view, reg-
ulation acts as a contract enforcement device that guarantees property
rights and, hence, e¢ cient trade.
This idea has been formalized by the early literature on insurance
regulation (see in particular Borch, 1981, Munch and Smallwood, 1981,
and Finsinger and Pauly, 1984). Its main implication is that minimum
2See, for instance, the January 2005 special issue on insurance regulation and risk
management of The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice.
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reserve levels may be benecial for consumers as they help to prevent
rms from cashing out reserves before claims occur. This result holds
despite the fact that insurers risk to forgo future prots when they in-
crease insolvency risk by reducing capital reserves.
One aspect of the insurance business that is entirely neglected by
this approach is rational consumer choice. In the above models it is
typically assumed that the demand for insurance is exogenously given
and independent of the nancial health of an insurance rm. However,
an insurance company that holds low levels of reserves o¤ers only lim-
ited protection against possible future losses. Therefore, consumers will
have a lower willingness to pay for its service. That is, consumers make
their demand for insurance contingent on the soundness of an insurance
company.3
Rees, Gravelle and Wambach (1999) make this point in a model of
insurance supply. They show that, if consumers are well informed about
an insurers level of capital, the insurer will always put up enough reserves
to ensure solvency. Similarly, it is shown that a regulatory restriction on
the insurers asset portfolio can only do harm. This chapter is a rst
step in the direction of a more realistic model of insurance markets with
solvency risk.4
However, it is restrictive in two respects. First of all, it assumes
perfect capital markets so that the cost of capital exactly equals the
expected return of reinvesting. This allows the insurer to build reserves
that cover all potential losses of its clients without cost, which seems
unrealistic. In reality, raising new capital has positive and increasing
3Besides inspecting its level of reserves directly, the solvency of an insurance
rm can be assessed by observing its credit ratings, its stock market performance,
reports by consumer associations and recommendations by brokers and the nancial
press. Cummins and Doherty (2006) show how brokers help consumers make an
informed choice regarding the characteristics of di¤erent insurance rms. Doherty
and Schlesinger (1990) demonstrate the impact of potential insolvency on insurance
demand.
4Other authors that have pleaded for a deregulation of insurance markets are
Eisen, Müller and Zweifel (1993), Rees and Kessner (1999) and Harrington (2002).
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capital costs because of the scarcity of capital and because investors
want to reduce agency problems by limiting free cash ow. Second of
all, the authors assume that consumers are identical which is essential
for the no-regulation result, as will be shown below.
This chapter builds a new model of insurance supply with rational
consumer choice, incorporating imperfect capital markets and heteroge-
neous policyholders. Increasing capital costs invalidate the earlier liter-
atures nding that an insurance rm either holds no capital reserves at
all or such high levels that the risk of bankruptcy is zero. Heterogeneity
among consumers then implies that the amount of reserves that di¤erent
consumers deem as appropriate are not the same.
The main result of the chapter is that although demand is negatively
a¤ected by capital reductions the insurer provides a level of capital that
is too low compared with the socially optimal level and invests too much
into risky assets. It is shown that a minimum reserve regulation com-
bined with price regulation and a restriction on risky investments can
implement the rst best outcome. However, in the more realistic case
where price regulation is not feasible, solvency regulation may actually
worsen the outcome because it may increase the extent to which an in-
surance rm makes use of market power. We conclude that solvency
regulation with rational consumers can only be successful if regulators
possess very precise information about risks and consumer preferences.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a new model
of insurance supply with increasing capital costs and rational consumers.
Section 4.3 then goes on to show the optimal pricing, capital and in-
vestment strategies by a monopoly insurer. Section 4.4 compares these
to the socially optimal levels. Section 4.5 shows what this implies for
regulation. And, nally, Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The Model
Consider a risk neutral monopoly insurer who o¤ers full insurance against
some exogenous risk which consumers are faced with. To abstract from
issues of adverse selection, we assume that risks are identical, that is, the
distribution of losses is the same across agents. There is some positive
measure of risk-averse consumers who may be heterogeneous (for instance
with respect to their degree of risk aversion and their wealth). Since there
is a continuum of consumers, any demand of strictly positive measure
has the property that all idiosyncratic risk is diversied away. Hence, the
distribution of average claims costs c (i.e., costs per client) has converged
to some cumulative distribution function G(c) which is assumed to be
continuously di¤erentiable with appropriate density g(c).5 Total claims
cost are then given by C(q; c) = qc, where q denotes the quantity of
policies sold.
Before o¤ering its insurance contract, the insurer commits to raising
some capital k per contract it sells. This gives rise to the cost (k)
per policy. Due to free cash ow concerns, we assume that 0(k) > 0
and 00(k) > 0.6 The insurance rm can invest its capital endowment
into either of two assets, a riskless asset with xed return r0  0 and
a risky asset with stochastic return r, which is uncorrelated to claims
cost and which is distributed according to the continuously di¤erentiable
distribution function F (r) with corresponding density f(r) on the interval
[r
¯
; r]. For instance, the risky asset could be the market portfolio from
a capital asset pricing model. It is natural to assume that r
¯
< r0 and
5See Wooldridge (1986) for this (and other) asymptotic results. Note that in the
unrealistic case where every individual risk is uncorrelated to any other risk, the law
of large numbers would imply that the distribution of average losses has converged to a
distribution that has all probability mass on the expected value of individual losses. In
this situation, the challange of capital and investment regulation would stem from the
uncertainty of an insurers assets alone and there would be no aggregate uncertainty
deriving from the claims distribution.
6Jensen (1986), among others, has argued that it is desirable to give managers
a hard budget constraint in order to reduce agency costs. This seems particularly
desirable in rms with large free cash ows such as insurance companies.
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E[r] > r0. Let  2 R denote the proportion of reserves that is invested
into the risky asset.7
Denoting the premium the insurer demands for insurance by , an
insurance contract o¤er is a tuple (; k; ). As the distribution of average
claims costs is independent of the precise magnitude of demand and since
the insurer raises capital on a per capita basis, individual demand is in-
dependent of expected aggregate demand, that is, there are no network
externalities and hence no issue of consumer coordination. Aggregate
demand is then given by some function D(; k; ) with inverse demand
(q; k; ). It turns out to be more convenient to work with inverse de-
mand. The insurers choice variables in that setting are q, k and . We
make the following assumption on insurance demand.8
Assumption Inverse demand (q; k; ) is such that (i) q() < 0,
(ii) k() > 0, (iii) kq() < 0, and (iv) q() > 0.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) simply say that consumers prefer cheaper
premiums and more capital (which reduces the risk of insurance default).
Assumption (iii) states that the agents who have a higher willingness to
pay for insurance also have a higher willingness to pay for decreased
insolvency risk of the insurer (in the form of a higher k). This follows
naturally from the fact that those are the more risk-averse consumers.
Finally, Assumption (iv) says that consumers with a higher willingness
to pay for insurance are relatively less interested in risky investments of
the insurance capital, again because of the higher degree of risk aversion
they have.9
The insurance companys end of period assets (net of liabilities) are
7We do not restrict  to lie in the interval [0; 1], which means that short sales of
risky assets are in principle allowed.
8Subscripts denote derivatives.
9Note that we do not make any assumptions on the sign of . This implies
that the investment policy  not necessarily a¤ects consumer utility in a monotonous
way (like the capital level). For example, customers may nd more risky investments
desirable at low levels of , while they may want to reduce them when  is large.
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given by the random variable
A(q; k; ; r) = q[(q; k; ) + k][1 + r + (1  )r0]  q(k).
This is simply premium income plus investment income minus the costs
of capital. End of period assets per policyholder are then given by
a(q; k; ; r) = A(q; k; ; r)=q.
Due to limited liability, the insurers end of period prot is  =
max fA(q; k; ; r)  C(q; c); 0g. The expected end of period prot is
therefore
 =
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
[A(q; k; ; r)  C(q; c)]dG(c)dF (r).
Integrating by parts and rearranging yields
 =
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
qG(c)dcdF (r). (4.1)
4.3 Prot Maximization
Since the insurance company is assumed to be risk-neutral, it maximizes
expected prot.
max
q;k;
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
qG(c)dcdF (r)
The rst order condition of this optimization problem with respect
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to q is10
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
G(c)dcdF (r) + qq
rZ
r
¯
[1 + r + (1  )r0]G(a)dF (r) = 0. (4.2)
The interpretation of this equation is straightforward: the rst term re-
ects the expected prot an additional consumer generates for the insur-
ance company (which is simply the expected average prot). The second
term shows the expected cost of lowering the premium in such a way that
one more consumer demands insurance: this is the reduction in premium
income qq multiplied by the expected probability of staying solvent.
The rst order condition with respect to k is
rZ
r
¯
G(a()) f(1 + k)[1 + r + (1  )r0]  0(k)g dF (r) = 0. (4.3)
This condition equates the expected marginal gain from raising capital
(given by stronger demand and increased expected investment returns)
with the corresponding marginal cost of capital on the capital market.
Note that this rst order condition as the one before is weighed with
G(a), the probability of staying solvent, since the insurer has a certain
prot of zero in the event of bankruptcy.
Finally, the rst order condition with respect to  is
rZ
r
¯
G(a())f[1 + r + (1  )r0] + ( + k)(r   r0)gdF (r) = 0. (4.4)
In order to interpret this condition, rst note that an investment in risky
assets has both an advantageous and a disadvantageous e¤ect for the
10In what follows we assume that the monopolists program is well behaved, having
interior solutions that fulll the appropriate second order conditions.
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consumer. On the one hand it increases the expected value of the in-
surers end of period wealth (which decreases the risk of insolvency). On
the other hand it increases the variance of the insurers asset portfolio
(which increases the risk of insolvency). Note that as long as   0, the
left hand side of (4.4) is strictly positive. That is, the insurer will increase
risk exposure beyond the point where premium income is maximized, so
 < 0 in equilibrium. The reason for this is that, being risk neutral,
the rm benets from a higher  through the expected returns on its
investment. Hence, marginal losses in premium income are equilibrated
with marginal expected asset returns.
4.4 Welfare
Jointly, equations (4.2) to (4.4) determine the monopolists contract
o¤er (m; km; m), where m = (qm; km; m). In order to determine
the socially optimal levels of capital and risk exposure, we set up the
following welfare function.
W (; k) =
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
qG(c)dcdF (r) +
qZ
0
(q̂; k; )dq̂   q(q; k; ) (4.5)
This is simply the summation of producer and consumer surplus. The
rst term is the monopolists expected prot, the second term is the
total rent that accrues to consumers (as measured by the area below the
demand curve), and, nally, the last term is given by the total premium
payments which have to be subtracted in order to determine net consumer
surplus.
This formulation implicitly assumes that what policyholders perceive
to be their surplus is an accurate measure for actual consumer surplus.
This will be the case whenever policyholders have an idea of how di¤er-
ing levels of capital and degrees of risk exposure translate into insolvency
probabilities for the insurance rm. As noted in the introduction, we as-
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sume here that consumers understand the product they purchase (say,
because they are informed about the ratings of the insurance rm). If
consumers instead underestimated the solvency risk of insurance compa-
nies (as the early literature on insurance regulation assumes), this would
actually strengthen the results we derive below.
Proposition 4.1 Given its output and investment strategy, the insur-
ance company provides less than the socially optimal level of capital.
Proof. Maximizing (4.5), the rst order condition with respect to k
is11
rZ
r
¯
G(a()) f(1 + k)[1 + r + (1  )r0]  0(k)g dF (r) (4.6)
= k  
qZ
0
k(q̂; k; )
q
dq̂.
Comparing (4.3) and (4.6) we see that the left-hand-sides are identical,
while the right-hand-side of (4.6) is not equal to zero. From Assumption
(iii) it immediately follows that k(q; k; ) < k(q̂; k; ) for all q̂ < q.
Therefore, the right-hand-side of (4.6) is strictly smaller than zero which
proves the result. 
Proposition 4.1 does not say that the insurance rm disregards con-
sumers desire for su¢ cient reserves. In fact the insurer knows that
putting up capital is an asset that makes the product insurance more
attractive and therefore increases consumerswillingness to pay for it.
However, at the equilibrium, the monopolist is concerned how a mar-
ginal alteration of its level of reserves a¤ects the marginal consumers
willingness to pay (the term k in equation (4.6)). A social planner,
on the other hand, worries how changes in capital a¤ect the average
11Again, second order conditions are assumed to hold.
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consumers willingness to pay (the term
R q
0
k(q̂;k;)
q
dq̂ in equation (4.6)).
Since intramarginal policyholders are more risk-averse, the monopolist
puts up too little reserves.
This result is akin to Spences (1975) classic nding that a product
market monopolist will provide the level of product quality desired by the
marginal consumer, while a social planner would choose the level desired
by the average consumer (see also Sheshinski, 1976). However, the result
di¤ers in two important respects. First of all, neither the marginal nor the
average policyholders preferred level of capital is chosen in the insurance
setting. Second, an insurance monopolist will always provide too little
capital, while the quality distortion in product markets can go either way.
That is, the insurance framework generates a far more structured result
although the environment is in principle more complex.12
Let us now turn to the composition of the insurers asset portfolio.
Here, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 Given its output and investment strategy, the insur-
ance company invests more into risky assets than is socially optimal.
Proof. Maximizing (4.5), the rst order condition with respect to 
is
rZ
r
¯
G(a())f[1 + r + (1  )r0] + ( + k)(r   r0)gdF (r) (4.7)
=   
qZ
0
(q̂; k; )
q
dq̂.
Comparing (4.4) and (4.7) we see that the left-hand-sides are identical,
while the right-hand-side of (4.7) is not equal to zero. From Assumption
12In insurance markets, a slight increase in capital reserves starting from the market
equilibrium will always be welfare enhancing. In product markets, on the other hand,
a small increase in product quality could be either benecial or detrimental to welfare,
depending on the demand function at hand.
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(iv) it immediately follows that (q; k; ) > (q̂; k; ) for all q̂ < q.
Therefore, the right-hand-side of (4.7) is strictly larger than zero. Hence,
the result. 
Proposition 4.2 has the same straightforward intuition as Proposition
4.1. The insurers preoccupation with the marginal consumer brings
about some degree of ignorance towards intramarginal policyholders who
would prefer a more secure investment strategy but still want to purchase
insurance.
4.5 Implications for Regulation
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 state that an insurance rm with market power
will provide too little capital and make investments that are too risky
given its clientspreferences. It is tempting to conclude from this that
the optimal regulatory policy should set a minimum reserve level and
restrict investments in risky assets in such a way that equations (4.6)
and (4.7) are fullled for the given q. This, however, would mean that
two important points are overseen:
1. Absent restrictions on premium choice, the insurer will try to cir-
cumvent solvency regulation by altering q (that is, by changing the
price of its product).
2. Even if this were not a concern, the socially optimal levels of k and
 depend on the optimal q, not the one chosen by an unregulated
monopolist.
In order to nd the socially optimal regulation, let us rst maximize
(4.5) with respect to q. This gives the rst order condition
rZ
r
¯
a()Z
0
G(c)dcdF (r)+qq
rZ
r
¯
[1+r+(1 )r0]G(a)dF (r) qq = 0. (4.8)
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A comparison of (4.2) and (4.8) immediately conveys that given k and
 the insurer underwrites too few policies (i.e., demands too high a
premium). This is simply a consequence of the assumption that it is
a monopolist. Equation (4.8), together with equations (4.6) and (4.7),
determines the welfare maximizing insurance contract (; k; ), where
 = (q; k; ). The optimal regulatory policy is characterized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 The socially optimal insurance contract (; k; )
can be implemented by a regulation that sets a price cap (  ), a
minimum reserve requirement (k  k), and restricts investments in
risky assets (  ).
Proof. It must be shown that at (; k; ) the monopolist does
not have an incentive to decrease , increase k, or decrease . From
inspection of (4.2) and (4.8) we nd thatWq = q qq. Hence,Wq > q
so that at (; k; ), where Wq = 0, we must have q < 0. Thus, the
insurance rm has no incentive to decrease  (which would be equivalent
to increasing q).
Inspecting (4.3) and (4.6) yields that Wk = k +
R q
0
k(q̂; k; )=qdq̂ 
k. From the proof of Proposition 4.1 we know the last two terms to be
positive together. Hence, Wk > k so that at (; k; ), whereWk = 0,
we must have k < 0. Thus, the insurance rm has no incentive to
increase k.
Finally, inspecting (4.4) and (4.7) yields that W =  +R q
0
(q̂; k; )=qdq̂   . From the proof of Proposition 4.2 we know the
last two terms to be negative together. Hence, W < , so that at
(; k; ), where W = 0, we must have  > 0. Thus, the insurance
rm has no incentive to decrease . Therefore, the proposed regulation
indeed implements (; k; ). 
Proposition 4.3 shows that an optimal regulation consists of two el-
ements: monopoly regulation (  ) and solvency regulation (k  k
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and   ). Therefore, it gives a theoretical foundation for the type of
solvency regulation that is observed in practice. In the model, the sol-
vency part is necessary for two distinct reasons. First of all it restrains
the insurers desire to cater to the marginal consumers preferences (as
argued in Section 4.4). Second of all, it is instrumental in preventing
the insurer from evading price regulation. Without it, the insurer would
lower costly reserves and increase its asset portfolios risk exposure in
order to make prots.
Many real world insurance markets are regulated in as strict a way
as proposed by Proposition 4.3, including both solvency and price reg-
ulation. However, quite often, price regulation is either not feasible or
not desirable. In particular, governments are often reluctant to intervene
into the price mechanism (and rightly so) because the prospect of prots
is what drives rms to provide desirable products in the rst place. The
question then is what the optimal solvency regulation looks like absent
price restrictions.
The second best outcome (; k; ) is determined by a two-stage
game where at stage one the regulator chooses k and  (equations (4.3)
and (4.4)), taking into account that the rm chooses  at stage two (equa-
tion (4.8)). It turns out that in this setting a minimum reserve regulation
(and a restriction on investments) still has its merits by providing an in-
surance product to consumers which is closer to their desires. As was
already pointed out above, however, this also leads the insurer to raise
prices. To some extent this is not objectionable. After all, higher capital
requirements are costly for the rm. If prices are increased in such a mild
way that there are still more policies sold than before the regulation, we
even have the positive side-e¤ect of a reduced output distortion and hence
a clear case for minimum capital requirements. If, however, the premium
increases so much that the rm sells less policies than before, the positive
impact of better solvency has to be weighed against the negative impact
of a stronger monopoly distortion. Proposition 4 demonstrates that this
second e¤ect may be so pronounced that the typical solvency regulation
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can only do harm.
Proposition 4.4 Depending on demand characteristics, any binding
minimum reserve regulation and restriction on risky assets may be detri-
mental to welfare in the absence of premium regulation.
Proof. We will prove the statement for a minimum reserve regulation
(assuming that  is xed). The proof for a restriction on the asset port-
folio is analogous. In order to verify the statement, we will have to show
that dW (q(km); km)=dk < 0 is possible. In order to do so, we will show
that the optimal second best level of capital k may be below km.
The most convenient comparison of km and k is by way of graphic
representation in a (k; q) plane. km is determined by the intersec-
tion of the curves q = 0 and k = 0 which are given by equa-
tions (4.2) and (4.3). Applying the implicit function theorem we nd
dk=dqjq=0 =  qq=qk and dk=dqjk=0 =  qk=kk. By the second or-
der conditions of the rms prot maximization problem both dk=dqjq=0
and dk=dqjk=0 have the same sign as qk, which is undetermined in gen-
eral. From now on, consider the case where qk < 0, which turns out to
be the relevant one.
We will rst determine the slope of the two curves. Simple algebra
yields that dk=dqjq=0 > dk=dqjk=0 is equivalent to qq kk (qk)
2 < 0
if qk < 0. As qq kk   (qk)2 > 0 by the second order conditions of
the monopolist, we can therefore conclude that dk=dqjq=0 < dk=dqjk=0
around (qm; km). The two curves are depicted in Figure 4.1. Their inter-
section determines the level of km.
The level of k is determined by the intersection of the curves q = 0
and dW (q(k); k)=dk = 0 which are given by equations (4.2) and (4.9). In
order to plot dW (q(k); k)=dk = 0 it turns out to be helpful to derive the
curve Wk = 0 rst, which is dened by (4.6). Comparing (4.3) and (4.6)
we nd
Wk = k +
qZ
0
k(q̂; k; )
q
dq̂   k.
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Figure 4.1: A case where k < km
As already derived in the proof of Proposition 4.1, the last two terms
together are positive, that is Wk > k. Hence, at any (k; q) satisfying
Wk = 0 we must have k < 0. Since qk < 0 by assumption, q must be
decreased given k in order to reach k = 0. That is, the curve k = 0
lies everywhere below the curve Wk = 0 as depicted in Figure 4.1.
The position of the curve dW (q(k); k)=dk = 0 will now be located
relative to the curve Wk = 0. We have dW (q(k); k)=dk = Wq  dq=dk +
Wk =  Wq qk=qq+Wk where we have plugged in dq=dk from above.
Noting that Wq = q   qq we therefore conclude that
dW (q(k); k)
dk
= qq
qk
qq
+Wk.
The rst term of the right-hand side expression is negative as qk, qq
and q are all negative. Therefore, at any (k; q) satisfying dW=dk = 0
we must have Wk > 0. Since Wkk < 0 by the second order conditions
for a welfare maximum, k must be increased to reach Wk = 0. That is,
the curve dW=dk = 0 lies below the curve Wk = 0. By how much it lies
below clearly depends on the size of the parameters (in particular qk).
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The optimal second best level of capital k is depicted in Figure 4.1
as the intersection of the curves dW=dk = 0 and k = 0. The gure
represents the situation where qk is so negative that the optimal k
is below km. Hence, in such a situation any binding minimum capital
requirement ~k > km would only push capital in the wrong direction. 
The discouraging result of Proposition 4.4 is that an insurance regu-
lator will need a tremendous amount of information in order to be suc-
cessful since not even the general direction of an optimal intervention is
certain. For some set of demand and risk characteristics, measures that
increase capital and decrease the riskiness of the investment policy may
be desirable. But for another set of characteristics, increasing capital and
reducing risky investments may only lead to a more intense exploitation
of market power. Absent very precise information concerning an insurers
risk management, regulation can easily lead astray.
4.6 Discussion
This chapter has shown in a simple model of insurance supply that insur-
ance companies with market power have a tendency to build insu¢ cient
reserves and to employ too risky investment strategies. This was shown
to be the case despite the fact that consumers are rational and reduce
their demand for insurance if the insurer runs a high risk of being un-
able to meet claims. To our knowledge, this model is the rst to justify
solvency regulation in a setting of rational consumer choice.
Note that the main results of the chapter critically hinge on the as-
sumption that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree
of risk aversion (which is implicitly stated in Assumptions (iii) and (iv)).
If consumers had identical degrees of risk-aversion (e.g., because they
have identical von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and identical
wealth levels), we would have kq() = q() = 0. Going through the
proofs of Proposition 1 and 2, one immediately nds that the welfare
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planners rst order conditions in this case collapse to the monopolists.
I.e., in the unrealistic case of identical consumers we would again have
Rees, Gravelle and Wambachs (1999) no-regulation result.
Another point worth discussing is whether the assumption of market
power (here in the form of a monopoly rm) is the appropriate setting to
describe real world insurance markets. Clearly, in most insurance mar-
kets several competing rms are active. Note, however, that insurance
markets are characterized by substantial search and switching costs due
to the complexity of the product and the necessity to assess the practice
of claims settlement (see Klemperer, 1995, for a general overview of the
literature on switching costs and Schlesinger and Schulenburg, 1991, for
an application to insurance markets). This gives insurers substantial mar-
ket power with respect to captive consumers, suggesting that in order
to moderate the distortions exposed by this chapter regulatory author-
ities should look for measures that lower search and switching costs and
enhance transparency and disclosure in order to promote competition in
insurance markets.
Finally, a word on the informational requirements for successful in-
surance regulation is in order. Clearly, an insurance regulator will have a
hard time obtaining the precise information required to determine the op-
timal regulation. Indeed, even an insurance rm will only have imprecise
knowledge of many of the variables involved. Given that the European
Union is determined to intensify solvency regulation via Solvency II, the
accompanying step of intensifying reporting needs concerning insurers
risk management appears to be a consistent requirement.
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